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Pre- and post-travel questionnaires mailed to American tourists visiting the Soviet Union record attitude change and serve as the basis for this eight-chapter research project report. Most of the report considers the relation of various factors to attitude change, including education, level of information, language ability, sex, age, occupation, and income. Several chapters are devoted to Americans' perceptions of the Soviet people, government, discussions of research methodology, research sample, and sample changes in attitude toward U.S. foreign relations. An overview on tourism in the Soviet Union is included in the introduction. Frequent use of graphs and tables illustrates the results of the questionnaires in a statistical breakdown of the pertinent material. Quotations on travel selected from literature and folk literature are cited at the beginning of each chapter. (AF)

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ATTITUDE CHANGE OF AMERICAN TOURISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

A Report by Peter Grothe
for the United States Office of Education

Project 8-C-046

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THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT

" Six blind beggars sitting by a roadside as an elephant passed were told they might touch it so that they would know what an elephant was like. The first one touched only the elephant's side and said, "He is like a well!" The second one felt only his tusk and said, "No, no, he is like a spear." The third one took hold of his trunk and said, "Surely, he is like a snake." "No such thing," cried the fourth, grasping one of his legs, "he is like a tree." The fifth one was a tall man and took hold of his ear and said, "All of you are wrong, he is like a fan." The sixth man happened to catch hold of his tail and cried, "O foolish fellows, he is not like a wall, nor a spear, nor a snake, nor a tree, not a fan; he is exactly like a rope." So the elephant passed on while the six blind men stood there quarreling, each being sure he knew exactly how the elephant looked, and each calling the others hard names because the rest did not agree with him."

- Old Indian Fable

Introduction

TOURISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

Russia is sublime --- a universal, ordered chaos.

Dostoevski in 1871

Russia is straddling the centuries ... pounding backward to Peter the Great and racing to overtake Henry Ford --- before she has caught up with Thomas Jefferson.

Anne O'Hare McCormick

Russia is not a state, but a world.

Czarist Proverb

The United States and the Soviet Union are the only two countries with the present capabilities of instantaneously obliterating each other. Thus, to state the obvious, it matters more what American images of Russia are--and vice versa--than what Peruvian images of Finland are (and vice versa).

As future world stability ---or the lack of it ---may well depend on the relationship of the USA and the USSR, it is vital to know something about the national images that these countries hold of the others.

Alexander H. Leighton wrote in Human Relations in a Changing World: "A central question in the matter of national attitude and belief is the way the members of any given nation perceive the members of another. Generally, the people of one nation---and the United States is no exception---harbor stereotyped images of other nations, starkly simple and exceedingly inaccurate.

"The nature of the various types of images----their comparison with reality, and the identification of causal factors are attackable problems. Until some headway is made, international relations must always be in danger of decisions based on fantasy." (Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World, New York, Dutton, 1949, pp. 102-3).

The research discussed in the following pages will address itself to American images of the Soviet Union and will only refer tangentially to Soviet images of us.

We will not be concerned with "reality", whatever that may be, but rather with perceptions of reality. As Kenneth Boulding, Robert North, Ole Holsti and others have pointed out, what matters in decision-making is not the objective situation, but rather perceptions of the objective situation. We act, not upon the "true facts" but rather upon our image of the true facts.

In the chapters that follow, we will not presume to judge the validity or invalidity of American images of the Soviet Union. What matters is that the respondents *think* their images are valid.

Although survey researchers and pollsters have periodically charted American public attitudes about the Soviet Union, no published research exists about the attitudes of Americans who have actually been to the Soviet Union. The only [illegible] research on this subject is an unpublished Yale University doctoral dissertation by Charles Neff (now of the University of Hawaii) who collected 320 before-travel and 285 after-travel questionnaires from tourists travelling to the Soviet Union in 1961.

We shall be reporting in these pages the results of a rather intensive inquiry into some American ideas about the Soviet Union. We will be investigating attitude change of a sample of 549 Americans ---all of whom filled out pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires---who traveled in the Soviet Union in 1965 and 1966-67. How does this sample perceive the Soviet government, Soviet people, and Soviet society before and after travel? To what extent---if at all---do the respondents change their attitudes about American public policy? Here are some further specific questions we will be asking:

To what extent, if at all, do Americans dichotomize between the Soviet government and people before and after travel?

Are attitudes more or less polarized after travel in the USSR, and, related to this, is there more or less stereotyping after travel?

How do positive-negative affect and strength-weakness perceptions change as a result of the trip?

How do self-perceptions of change compare with objectively-measured change?

How is attitude change related to expectations of friendliness or hostility?

How are different motivations for going related to attitude change?

Does the data support the "mirror image" hypothesis?

How do the respondents' attitudes change on the action component question?

On what aspects of Soviet life does significant group-learning take place?

Do people react more negatively to political or economic factors in the Soviet Union?

How does the sample of 501 persons who completed only the pre-travel questionnaire compare with those who filled out both pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires?

How are the following variables related to attitude change of American tourists: sex, age, occupation, religion, education, section of country, income, party affiliation, 1964 voter preference, and ability to speak Russian?

How are the following aspects of travel experience itself related to attitude change: previous trips to the USSR; travel in other Communist countries; length of visit; group travel or independent travel; amount of contact with Soviet citizens---both official and unofficial; and number of political discussions?

Why the Subject is Important

Some studies are useful for theory-building. Others are useful for policy planning. It is always fortuitous when one can find a topic that has a potential contribution to make in both areas. Already, a number of American and Soviet officials in the cultural exchange field have expressed a keen interest in seeing the results of the research, and, hopefully, the data will be relevant for decision-makers in that field.

Further, it is to be hoped that this research can make some modest contribution to on-going theory in the area of attitude change--- specifically in the field of foreign travel as a factor in attitude change. As Herbert Kelman has written:

"Experience in a foreign country exposes an individual to a variety of influences that may challenge his existing attitudes and values. He is confronted with new cultural patterns and solutions to life problems; he is expected to take on new roles and experiment with new forms of behaviour; he interacts with different people and becomes involved in new groups; he is faced with challenges to some of his preconceptions; and he is able to observe himself in unfamiliar situations. These experiences may lead to varying degrees of attitude change, or to a confirmation of earlier attitudes or, perhaps, a defensive resistance to change".

(Kelman, Herbert, Journal of Conflict Resolution, "Effects of Cross-cultural Experience on National Images", p.319.)

If foreign travel in general does tend to have an effect on people's attitudes---as numerous studies indicate---then one might speculate that travel in the Soviet Union has a comparatively larger impact for the following reasons. A trip to the USSR is for many a very intense experience. As one of the respondents, a student, commented, "Every morning I woke up in Russia I knew something incredible was going to happen to me that day---and it always did!" Travel to the Soviet Union is also, for many, a highly politicized experience. Tourists are constantly aware of being Americans, of the contrast between the American and Soviet political systems, and---not infrequently---they are challenged on their most basic political assumptions. Further, tourists generally visit the Soviet Union for basically different reasons than they visit, for example, Switzerland or the Bahamas. Our data shows that they go to the Soviet Union not so much to relax or to enjoy the scenery as to have a learning experience.

Smith, Bruner, and White, in their depth study of the relationship between opinion and personality, listed the reasons why they thought that the area of opinion on the Soviet Union was an especially fortuitous focus of research:

"(A) The area of opinion should be one about which people have more-or-less crystallized views. (B) It should be a controversial area on which there is a substantial division of opinion. (C) It should be relatively independent of political party and not be a direct reflection of class membership. (D) It should be reasonably charged with anxiety or other forms of affect. (E) It should be on a socio-political level to parallel the problems normally met in opinion-polling. (F) It should be a topic of continuing contemporary interest. (G) It should preferably be a topic of some social and political significance in and of itself."

(Smith, M. Brewster, Bruner, Jerome, and White, Robert, Opinions & Personality, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1956, p.49)

Tourism in the Soviet Union

Of the millions of tourists who leave America's borders each year, only a miniscule number visit the Soviet Union. During 1966, for example, 14,700,000 Americans departed from the United States, ("The American Tourist," by Somerset Waters, The Annals of the American Academy, November, 1966, Vol. 368, p.110) but according to State Department Figures, only an estimated 20,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union that year. That means that the Soviet Union received about 00.13 per cent of the total flow of American tourism in 1966.

It is difficult to tell with any precision how many Americans visit the Soviet Union each year. Soviet figures from 1956 (the year in which travel to the Soviet Union resumed) to 1960 are the following: 1956, 2,500; 1957, 2,500; 1958, 8,000; 1959, 11,000; and 1960, 20,000. However, the U.S. State Department's rough estimate for 1960 is only 10,000-12,000. State Department approximations for the years following 1960 are the following: 1961, 1962 and 1963, 8,000-10,000; 1964, 10,000; 1965, 10,000-12,000; 1966, 18,000-20,000; and 1967, 20,000-22,000.

Soviet figures are significantly higher. For example, the Soviets list the 1963 figure as 19,500, roughly twice as high as the American figure. According to Soviet sources, about 30,000 Americans visited the USSR in 1966 and 1967, approximately 10,000 higher than the State Department estimation.

It may well be that the Soviet figures are the more accurate ones. State Department officials say that their figures are only rough approximations, based on the number of tourists who indicate on their passport applications that they will be traveling to the USSR. The State Department passport division points out that many tourists who state an intention of visiting the Soviet Union don't actually go there. On the other hand, many Americans visit the Soviet Union who didn't have that intention when they filled out their passport application forms. The Soviets have the advantage of precise records of how many visas were issued to Americans, so that one might speculate that their figures are more accurate, unless, for some reason, they have inflated their figures.

The best guess, then, is that between 1956 and the end of 1967, between 150,000 and 200,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union.

Despite the relatively small number of Americans visiting the Soviet Union, a persuasive case can be made that they play a significant role in the formation of American images of Russia. As our data will indicate, American travelers to the Soviet Union tend to be in the socio-economic elite, and they also tend to be very communicative about their experience. When asked on the questionnaire whether they intended to speak or write about their travel experience in the Soviet Union, a surprisingly-high 75 per cent of the respondents answered in the affirmative.

Although relatively few Americans visit the Soviet Union, the USSR is not neglected by tourists. In 1967, 1,750,000 tourists went to the Soviet Union, up 250,000 from the previous year. According to a _Time_ magazine article (_Time_, July 28, 1967, p.54), about half the tourists come from other European Communist countries. _Time_ also estimates that Intourist, the state-run tourist agency, spends $1,000,000 a year in advertising abroad. According to Raymond Anderson of the _New York Times_, a Soviet economist has estimated that the average spending of one tourist in the USSR equals the profit of the export of nine tons of coal, fifteen tons of oil, or two tons of top-quality wheat.

Although the contingent of Americans annually traveling to the Soviet Union is relatively small, it has the appearance of a vast, endless army compared to the number of Soviets who visit the United States. In 1965, for example, a total of 114 Soviets visited the United States. (_The Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament of the United States Exchanges Program With the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe_, Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by Eric Stevenson, The George Washington University, 1967, p.62).

Tourism in the Soviet Union is quite unlike tourism in Western countries. If an American wants to visit France and plans to spend three days each in Paris and Tours, he may or may not make hotel reservations, as he so chooses. If he finds that he especially likes Paris and wants to extend his visit there by three days and cancel his plans for Tours, he will simply do so, normally without complications. However, if the same American wants to visit the Soviet Union he must tell his travel agent exactly which ones of the approximately seventy "open" cities he wants to visit and specify when he'll be there. Then the Intourist office in Moscow must approve of the itinerary, which it usually does. When Intourist inexplicably denies a tourist access to a certain "open" city or cities, it never tells him he can't go there. It simply tells him that the flight he wanted is filled (sometimes two months ahead of time), or that the hotel was burned down.

When Intourist does approve the itinerary, then the tourist must pay everything in advance *before* the Soviet Consulate will grant him a visa (which it rarely denies). The visa, which used to take weeks and even months in the 1950's, now is usually granted within three to five days.

Once in the Soviet Union, the tourist has no choice over what hotel he stays in, nor does he know what hotel he will be in until he arrives in the city. Intourist simply assigns him an hotel. If a tourist happens to especially like any city in which he is staying and wants to extend his stay there, he will find that adjusting his travel schedule in the Soviet Union is one of life's more arduous undertakings.

Although American tourists frequently complain about Intourist's bureaucratic inflexibility, they often compliment Intourist for offering a service usually not found in other countries: transference to hotels from airports and train stations and then transference from hotels back to the transportation depots. Intourist also routinely provides opportunities which are the exception rather than the rule in other countries: visits to collective farms, schools, Young Pioneer camps, factories, etc.

How do Americans generally rate the Soviet Union in terms of tourist comforts and conveniences? If a perusal of travel articles, open-ended answers in our questionnaires, and conversations with returning tourists is any indication, the answer is: not too well. Marvin Kalb, diplomatic correspondent for CBS News, who formerly reported from the Soviet Union, summed up the attitude of many in an article in the Saturday Review (although his prose was perhaps a bit more graphic and outspoken than most):

" 'This is a hard climate, and an American finds many things to try his patience, but few that are capable of winning his affections.' There are days when I profoundly agree with Neill S. Brown's observation above, even though it is 114 years old. He was the American Minister of the Czarist Court of Saint Petersburg in 1853. The climate is hard, even now, and the Russians have a perfectly magical way of trying your patience--in fact, tying it up in knots. Bolshevism only added ideology to an old Russian pastime. Besides, after you have enjoyed the Bolshoi Ballet, marvelled at the Moscow Art Theater, and eaten caviar for breakfast four days in a row, what else is there? Comparatively speaking, the food is poor, the service slow, the beds are lumpy, the language is impossible, the bureaucracy is maddening, and, yes, the system is dictatorial.

"Is Russia a tourist country? Definitely not! Yet, there are days when I disagree with Brown and myself. For even if Russia is not a tourist country, it is a country which ought to be visited by tourists....The Soviet

Union is one of the most important, most powerful, and most fascinating countries in the world". ("Is Russia A Tourist Country?", by Marvin Kalb. Saturday Review, January 7, 1967, p.51.)

Baedeker's guide of 1914 had advised travelers to Russia to take "sheets, towels, pillows, a small india-rubber bath, and some insect powder, and warned that hotels in provincial towns satisfy as a rule only the most moderate demands, and they often leave much to be desired in point of cleanliness". (quoted in America and the Soviet Experiment 1917-1933, by Peter G. Filene, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p.98)

Clearly, travel conditions have improved vastly since Baedecker wrote his 1914 guide to Russia, and, according to travel writers and visitors who return periodically to the Soviet Union, travel conditions have improved since the 50's.

However, the consensus of American tourists (who, after all, do have a reputation as being a pampered lot) is that the Soviet tourist industry doesn't deserve any trophies for speed, efficiency, modernity, economy or provision for the latest in tourist conveniences.

Chapter I

METHODOLOGY

METHODOLOGY

"Everyone is a prisoner of his own experiences. No one can eliminate prejudices----just recognize them".

----Edward R. Murrow

"Those who never retract their opinions love themselves more than they love truth".

----Joubert

"For those who do not think, it is best at least to rearrange their prejudices once in awhile".

----Luther Burbank

In addition to the normal problems facing any survey researcher attempting to gather data by means of the mailed questionnaire, we had one special one---how to locate tourists who were planning to visit the Soviet Union.

In order to carry out a proper study of attitude change we had to reach tourists before and after travel to the USSR. First, we approached the Passport Division of the Department of State, and asked if we could have the names of those who declared in their passport applications that they intended to visit the USSR. An official of the Passport Division replied that there was a standing rule against giving out names of passport applicants.

The only other alternative was to obtain the names through travel agencies. Luckily, the majority of American tourists visiting the Soviet Union are handled by less than a dozen travel agencies which specialize in Eastern European travel, and four of these agencies generously agreed to include our questionnaires in their mailings to persons intending to visit Russia. We also received invaluable assistance in questionnaire distribution from the Governmental Affairs Institute, which conducted a briefing center in New York for tourists planning to visit the USSR.

Important help was also forthcoming from several universities which administered summer language programs in the Soviet Union.

The fact that persons planning to visit the Soviet Union were geographically spread out left us no choice but to use the mailed questionnaire technique. Even if we did have a choice, we would have sacrificed the greater comprehensiveness of the interview for the larger sample available through the mailed questionnaire (given the limitations of funding and personnel).

As the literature on survey research usually points out, non-response is a major problem in survey research via mailed questionnaire. Although we tried to maximize response, non-response was not a crucial problem in our reserach, for we were not attempting to obtain a cross-section of the American public, or even a cross-section of those traveling to the Soviet Union. As different tourist agencies cater to somewhat different clienteles, and as it is generally assumed that there are some demographic differences between those who do and those who don't respond to mailed questionnaires, we were under no illusion that our sample was a perfect cross-section of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. However, we did not feel this problem was crucial, because we were mainly interested in making internal comparisons, i.e., how Goldwater voters perceived the Soviet Union compared to Johnson voters, elderly compared to young, etc.

We printed 4,000 pre-travel questionnaires, and a very rough estimate is that 3,300 to 3,500 actually reached the hands of tourists. Hoping to maximize response, we enclosed with the questionnaire a stamped, return-addressed envelope and the following letter (mimeographed on George Washington University stationery).

Dear Traveler to the Soviet Union:

We are conducting research at The George Washington University on various kinds of attitudes held by persons visiting the Soviet Union in order to understand how American travelers feel about the Soviets and some aspects of American public policy.

What do American tourists going to the Soviet Union like and dislike about the Soviet government and people? Most would agree that this is a fascinating question, but, as yet, we don't have any definitive answer, based on scientific research. We are asking you to join with well over 1,000 other Americans going to the Soviet Union to help us find the answer. Your cooperation in filling out and returning the enclosed questionnaire will be invaluable.

You are asked to fill out your mailing address so that we can send you a follow-up questionnaire when you return. By comparing pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires, we can study what new insights Americans have about the Soviet Union as a result of their travel. If you are interested, we will be glad to send you a summary of the results of this study.

Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. We are interested in your responses only as part of data of a large national sample. No person will be identified by name in this study. We repeat---*your answers will be kept strictly confidential.*

Many of those who have already completed the questionnaire have commented that it was an enjoyable exercise. It should not take you more than eleven or twelve minutes to fill out. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. There are many honest differences of opinion on the questions asked.

Thank you very much for your cooperation. Enjoy your trip!

Sincerely yours,

Peter Grothe
Project Director

We received 1,087 completed pre-travel questionnaires, but of these, thirty-six had to be voided for various reasons. The most common cause for voiding was the respondent's failure to fill out the pre-travel questionnaire until *after* he had returned from his trip. In short, approximately one-third of those who received the mailed questionnaires returned them, which was roughly what we had anticipated. Some mailed-questionnaire projects have response rates as low as ten per cent, but as tourists to the Soviet Union tend to be in the upper socio-economic brackets (who traditionally have a better batting average in responding to questionnaires) and have a relatively high degree of interest in the subject of the questionnaire, we anticipated a considerably better response rate than ten per cent. One of the factors working against a very high response rate of 50 per cent or over was that the kind of persons traveling to the Soviet Union tend to be busier than the average man. Another factor may have been the sensitivity on the part of many to answering questions relating to the Soviet Union and the Communist system, even though our covering letter emphasised that answers would be kept strictly confidential. One can speculate that the Joe McCarthy period is still a painful memory for many. Our guess is that we would have received a higher response rate if tourists had been able to fill out their questionnaires anonymously, but, unfortunately, this was not possible. We needed the names in order to send follow-up questionnaires after the return home.

We attempted to maximize response on the post-travel questionnaires by the following means:

Tourists were asked to state the anticipated date of return home on their pre-travel questionnaires. The sending of the post-travel questionnai was timed so that it arrived at the home of the respondent two to three days after he returned home. Our reasoning was that if the questionnaire was waiting for the traveler when he returned home it would probably be part of a large stack of mail and might be discarded or ignored. On the other hand, we did want the tourist to receive the questionnaire while the travel experience was still reasonably fresh in his mind. Accompanying the blue printed questionnaire was a return-addressed, stamped envelope and the following covering letter:

Dear Traveler to the Soviet Union:

Thank you very much for filling out our pre-travel questionnaire.

Your cooperation in completing and returning the enclosed post-travel questionnaire will be invaluable. We realize that you probably have a busy schedule, but for the purposes of this research it is critically important that all those who filled out the pre-travel questionnaires also fill out the post-travel questionnaires, so that we can learn what new insights you have as a result of your travel.

We will be glad to send you a free summary of the findings, when this study is completed. If you would like the summary, please note that on the questionnaire.

Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. No person will be identified by name in this study. We are interested in your responses only as part of a large national sample.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Peter Grothe
Project Director

We hoped that the promise of a free summary of the results would serve as an added inducement to complete both questionnaires. We have reason to believe that it did, for 100 per cent of the persons filling out the post-travel questionnaires checked the box requesting the summary. If the person who filled out the pre-travel questionnaire did not return the post-travel questionnaire within [illegible] weeks of the time it was sent to him, he was sent the identical questionnaire and covering letter. If we didn't hear from him in yet another two weeks, he was sent the following postcard:

Dear Mr. Jones:

When you sent us your pre-travel questionnaire, you became part of a unique research group. Many thanks for your initial participation in this study of attitudes of Americans traveling in the Soviet Union. We hope that you won't drop out of this group at this time. We realize that the questionnaire may have been placed aside in the press of business upon return home, but as it is most vital that everyone who filled out the pre-travel questionnaire also complete the post-travel questionnaire, we hope you will send it at your earliest convenience. As promised, we will send you a free summary of the results.

Many thanks,

Peter Grothe

Despite these efforts to maximize response, only 549 persons or 54 per cent of the 1051 persons who filled out pre-travel questionnaires completed the post-travel questionnaires. This doesn't include the thirty-six pre-travel questionnaires which were voided. We had hypothesized that a somewhat higher percentage of those who had bothered to complete the pre-travel questionnaire would have filled out the post-travel questionnaires, but perhaps our expectations were unduly optimistic. In the next chapter, we will compare the demographic characteristics of those who completed both pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires with those who filled out only the pre-travel questionnaires.

As mentioned above, we used the mailed questionnaire because of the savings in time, money, and professional energy this technique affords over the interview. However, when we spent five weeks in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968, we informally interviewed about fifty American tourists in order to get a better feeling for the data we already had. Fortunately, all of the data was gathered before the Czech crisis of

August, 1968. If the Czech crisis had occurred before all the questionnaires had been completed----and especially if it had occured between the filling out of pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires, we might have received distorted data.

As to the writing itself of the questionnaires, it was a long, painstaking process. It took six weeks to write, rewrite, and pre-test the pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires. We rewrote the questionnaires at least ten times and subjected them to the critical scrutiny of a dozen very able social scientists. The questionnaires were pre-tested on thirty respondents. As will be seen by reading the questionnaires in the appendix, about two-thirds of the questions on the pre-travel and post-travel questionnaires are identical. Those questions which are asked only once are, for the most part, to obtain data on the demographic variables (in the pre-travel questionnaire) and on the travel experience itself (in the post-travel questionnaire). Because we anticipated a tremendous input of data, and therefore utilization of a computer, most of the questions were closed. Those which were open were, for the most part, easily coded for computer use.

As is true in most enterprises of this type, we fell far short of utopia. Our principal frustration is that there were several potential-rich ores of data which we were not able to mine---unless, that is, respondents would have been willing to spend more than an hour completing questionnaires. Without high-powered inducements this would have been unlikely. As our response rate probably would have dipped below ten per cent if we had asked all the questions we wanted to, we had to limit ourselves to the nucleus of questions we thought to be most relevant to our guiding hypotheses.

If this were the best of all possible research worlds (that is, if a large percentage of respondents would happily spend an hour or two filling out questionnaires---or, if we had a staff of professional interviewers at our disposal), we would have tried to obtain more data on the personality and background of the respondents.

For example, it might have been most useful to ask the "conservative personality" battery of questions devised by Herbert McCloskey. It would have been instructive to see how the "conservative personality" perceives the Soviet Union and to learn just how open to attitude change he is. Another valuable piece of data would have been the respondent's sources of information about the Soviet Union. Does he rely on television newscasts for most of his information on the Soviet Union or on the printed word? If the latter, is it The New York Times and Foreign Affairs or The New York Daily News and True magazine? Has he read any books about the Soviet Union in recent years and, if so, what kinds of books? Related to these questions, it would have been useful to know just how well-informed about the Soviet Union the respondent was. (However, it would have been most difficult to test the respondent on his level of information on a self-administered questionnaire. There would have been the temptation to look up the answers.)

We had originally included in the draft of our pre-travel questionnaire a question asking whether either or both of the respondent's parents were born in the Soviet Union, but as we wanted to design a questionnaire that didn't take more than 15 minutes to fill out, we had to delete some questions which seemed to be expendable, and that was one of them.

It also would have been useful to gather more data on the travel experience itself. Did the tourist have any especially memorable good or bad experiences, and what were they? We would have liked to know more about the depth of communication with Russians. For example, how many, if any, real friendships did the tourist make? Does he plan to correspond regularly with any Russians? A gap in our data which we keenly regret is a paucity of information about communication within the travel group. As the great majority of our respondents traveled with organized groups, and as we make the assumption that the group plays a significant role in the formation of attitudes of the individual, it would have been most useful to know more about the nature of the groups and intra-group communication. Unfortunately, for our purposes, the interview is a much more refined technique for eliciting this kind of data than the mailed questionnaire. To have attempted to obtain this kind of information on a mailed questionnaire would have meant a marked elongation of the questionnaire.

As we will attempt to point out in a subsequent chapter, foreign travel sometimes can affect the traveler's attitudes towards his own country more than his attitudes towards the country visited. For this reason, we would have liked to include more questions than we actually did on attitudes towards the United States and on American public policy.

To repeat, in order to maximize response, we had to hold the questionnaire to a manageable length---which meant the exclusion of a number of questions which might have yielded important data. We simply had to make value judgements on which questions were most central. Perhaps, if in the future, some social scientist wants to follow up on our research he can ask the questions which we have put in a deep-freeze unit.

Finally, before turning to the findings of this research, we want to add a few words on terminology. In the literature on public opinion, the words "opinions" and "attitudes" have been used either interchangeably or with somewhat different meanings. We choose to use them interchangeably. Also, we will use "the Soviet Union" and "Russia" interchangeably, although, of course, we are aware that there are fourteen Soviet republics in addition to the Russian republic.

Chapter II

THE SAMPLE

THE SAMPLE

"Public opinion is a compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs."

---- Robert Peel

"I know where there is more wisdom than is found in Napoleon, Voltaire, or all the ministers present and to come ---- in public opinion."

---Talleyrand

The 549 respondents who travelled to the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1967 were hardly a typical group of Americans. They were much better educated, much wealthier and older than a random sample of Americans. Our sample (we repeat ---- we have no way of verifying to what extent our sample approximates a random sample of Americans travelling in the Soviet Union) included less than one per cent non-Caucasians and less than one per cent blue-collar and white-collar workers. Four groups ---- students, professionals, businessmen, and teachers ---- formed over 90% of our sample. (See Table II-1A.)

Perhaps the single most striking fact about our sample is that 42 per cent did post-graduate work or attended professional school. Only eight persons, or 1.48%, did not get past the eight grade. Eighty-six per cent had at least some college and, according to Census Bureau figures, this is more than four times the national average. No comparative figures exist, of course, but one can speculate that the Soviet Union receives a more highly educated group of American tourists than any other country on the globe! (See Table II-2A.)

Indeed, a glance at Table III-3A suggests that for most respondents a trip to Russia seems to be a kind of intellectual endeavor. Tourists generally do not go to the USSR to marvel at the scenery. When queried about their primary motivation for visiting the Soviet Union, the following four reasons were cited most frequently:

(1) To be able to talk with Soviet citizens (27%).

(2) To assess for myself the state of affairs in the USSR (18.4%).

(3) To make a trip which represents a new kind of travel experience (18%).

(4) To talk with Soviet counterparts in my field (17%).

The primary motivation mentioned by only six per cent of the respondents -- to see the famous sights -- is quite possibly the reason that most American tourists would list if they were asked why they were going to countries like, for example, France, Italy or Austria.

In view of the data on education and motivation for going, it is not surprising that our sample follows accounts of public affairs significantly more than a cross-section of Americans. We asked a question worded very similarly to a question which Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture (Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, p. 89.) asked of a random sample of 970 Americans about the extent to which they followed political and governmental affairs. We found that 59% of our sample responded "regularly", compared to 27% for the Almond-Verba sample. Thirty-eight per cent said "from time to time" and 3% said "very seldom" in our sample, compared to 53% responding "from time to time" and 19% responding "never" in the Civic Culture study. (Table II-4A.)

Probably related to the comparatively high level of education of our respondents, to the motivation for travel, and to the degree to which they follow public affairs is the rather arresting fact (alluded to earlier) that 75% of them said that they intended to communicate about their travel experience, either in writing for publication or in speaking to organized groups, upon return home.

When we asked respondents how well-informed about the Soviet Union they considered themselves, 13% said, "very well-informed", 71% said, "somewhat informed", and 16% said, "not well-informed". We would have much preferred, of course, to have some kind of objective measurement on this question. Undoubtedly, some who are very well-informed were modest and checked "somewhat informed", whereas some who were not well-informed or somewhat informed were immodest and checked "well-informed". For this reason, we must be cautious in interpreting this data. Perhaps all it really reliably tells us is something about self-perceptions of degree of knowledge about the Soviet Union. (Table II-5A.)

Turning again to some of the demographic characteristics of our sample, we find that in some cases they differ significantly from what one might find in a national random sample.

Seventy-three per cent of the respondents were men, whereas women actually form a slight majority of the population. Men were disproportionately represented in our sample, because we allotted only one questionnaire per household, and we requested that, whenever possible, the head of the household fill out the questionnaire. (Table II-6A.)

Only 9% of our sample came from the West, and only 12% came from the South, compared to 41% for the Midwest and 37% for the East. The West and South were under-represented in our sample, because the clienteles of the tourist agencies that cooperated with us were mainly in the Midwest and East. (Table II-7A.) In making the sectional designation for each respondent, we only counted him if he was now living in the same geographic area in which he was born. For example, someone born in New Jersey who now lived in New York was counted as an Easterner, but someone who was born in Alabama and who now lived in New York was not counted at all. This was because we had no way of knowing when he moved to New York and in which section of the country he had his most formative experiences.

A glance at Table II-8A shows that 52% of our respondents were forty-one or older and that only 28% were between the ages of twenty-one to forty. Nineteen per cent were between eighteen and twenty-one. The relative paucity of persons in the twenty-one-to-forty age bracket is probably explained by the fact that many in this age group are raising children too small to take to the USSR. Further, a trip to the Soviet Union is relatively expensive, and many in this age group are paying mortgages on houses and expenses for children.

Sixty-six per cent of our sample said they were Protestant, 12% Jewish, and 11% Catholic. (Table II-9A.) As Catholics outnumber Jews by more than eight-to-one in the United States (The World Almanac 1967, Doubleday, New York, pp. 148-149), Jews are quite obviously disproportionately represented in our sample. This is partly explained by the fact that Jews tend to fall in the upper socio-economic brackets, compared to other religious groupings.

Further, one of the travel agencies that cooperated in this study has a very large New York clientele, and New York, as is well-known, has a large Jewish population.

Our average respondent is considerably wealthier than the average American. A look at Table II-10A shows that 24% make $25,000 or more per year and that almost three-quarters of the sample makes $10,000 or more.

Respondents were asked two questions about political persuasion in the after-travel questionnaire. Fifty-nine per cent voted for Lyndon Johnson, and 39% voted for Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election. These figures are remarkably close to the national voting percentages. When asked about party affiliation, 46% said they were Republicans, 38% said they were Democrats, and 15% checked the "other" category. (The great majority in this category are Independents.)

COMPARISON OF THOSE WHO COMPLETED BOTH SETS OF QUESTIONNAIRES WITH THOSE WHO ONLY FILLED OUT THE PRE-TRAVEL QUESTIONNAIRES

In the pages that immediately follow, we have placed tables of data (mainly demographic data) about non-respondents on the after-travel questionnaire just below the corresponding tables on those who did respond to both pre-travel and post-travel questionnaire. This allows the reader to easily compare the characteristics of the two groups of respondents.

The tables are self-explanatory, and there is no need for extended comment, except to observe that the data does not contain any stunning surprises.

TABLE II-1A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Occupation	%	No.
1. Students	30	159
2. Professions	26	140
3. Businessman	21	113
4. Farmer	7	37
5. Other	1	4
6. Teacher	15	83

TABLE II-1B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Occupation	%	No.
1. Students	28	136
2. Professions	22	107
3. Businessman	33	160
4. Farmer	14	68
5. Other	3	17
6. Teacher	0	0

TABLE II-2A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Education	%	No.
1. Grammar school	1	8
2. Some high school	4	21
3. Finished high school	8	42
4. Some college	29	156
5. Finished college	16	85
6. Post gratuate work or professional school	42	228

TABLE II-2B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Education	%	No.
1. Grammar school	4	21
2. Some high school	5	26
3. Finished high school	16	78
4. Some college	23	114
5. Finished college	15	74
6. Post graduate work or professional school	36	175

TABLE II-3A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Motivation for going	%	No.
1. To be able to talk with Soviet citizens	27	149
2. To assess for myself the state of affairs in the USSR	18	100
3. To make a trip which represents a new kind of travel experience	18	98
4. To talk with Soviet counterparts in my field	17	91
5. To study the language	8	43
6. To see the famous sights in the USSR	6	34
7. Other	5	27

TABLE II-3B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Motivation for going	%	No.
1. To make a trip which represents a new kind of travel experience	24	119
2. To talk with Soviet counterparts in my field	22	110
3. To assess for myself the state of affairs in the USSR	18	91
4. To be able to talk with Soviet citizens	17	85
5. To see the famous sights in the USSR	11	54
6. Other	4	21
7. To study the language	2	12

TABLE II-4A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Follow Accounts of Political Affairs	%	No.
1. Regularly	59	324
2. From time to time	38	207
3. Very seldom	3	16

TABLE II-4B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Follow Accounts of Political Affairs	%	No.
1. Regularly	54	267
2. From time to time	41	204
3. Very seldom	5	24

TABLE II-5A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Self-evaluation of Being Well-informed on the Soviet Union	%	No.
1. Very well-informed	13	74
2. Somewhat informed	71	387
3. Not well-informed	16	87

TABLE II-5B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Self-evaluation of Being Well-informed on the Soviet Union	%	No.
1. Very well-informed	6	29
2. Somewhat informed	74	363
3. Not well-informed	20	101

TABLE II-6A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Sex	%	No.
1. Male	73	397
2. Female	27	149

TABLE II-6B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Sex	%	No.
1. Male	69	338
2. Female	31	153

TABLE II-7A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Area of the country	%	No.
1. East	37	155
2. Midwest	41	172
3. South	12	50
4. West	9	39

TABLE II-7B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Area of the country	%	No.
1. East	22	82
2. Midwest	56	214
3. South	16	59
4. West	7	25

TABLE II-8A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Age	%	No.
1. 16 - 17	2	10
2. 18 - 21	19	106
3. 22 - 25	10	52
4. 26 - 30	4	20
5. 31 - 35	7	37
6. 36 - 40	7	38
7. 41 - 50	17	91
8. 51 - 60	22	122
9. 61 and over	13	69

TABLE II-8B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Age	%	No.
1. 16 - 17	2	9
2. 18 - 21	8	41
3. 22 - 25	4	18
4. 26 - 30	4	18
5. 31 - 35	4	19
6. 36 - 40	6	30
7. 41 - 50	23	112
8. 51 - 60	25	124
9. 61 and over	24	120

TABLE II-9A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Religion	%	No.
1. Protestant	66	357
2. Catholic	11	59
3. Orthodox	1	8
4. Jewish	12	67
5. None	8	41
6. Other	2	12

TABLE II-9B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Religion	%	No.
1. Protestant	74	366
2. Catholic	11	54
3. Orthodox	1	4
4. Jewish	6	29
5. None	5	27
6. Other	3	13

TABLE II-10A
Respondents on Both Questionnaires

Approximate income	%	No.
1. Under $5,000	4	15
2. $5,000 - $9,999	23	96
3. $10,000 - $14,999	26	107
4. $15,000 - $24,999	23	95
5. $25,000 and over	24	98

TABLE II-10B
Non-respondents on Second Questionnaire

Approximate income	%	No.
1. Under $5,000	5	21
2. $5,000 - $9,999	23	100
3. $10,000 - $14,999	26	109
4. $15,000 - $24,999	24	101
5. $25,000 and over	22	96

Survey researchers working with mailed questionnaires have generally found better rates of response among the better-educated; students; teachers and professionals; those younger; men; and the better-salaried.

A glance at our tables shows that, indeed, the better-educated had a somewhat better record of response than the less-educated; that student, teachers, and professionals were more likely to complete after-travel questionnaires than farmers and businessmen; and that those under forty had a response rate higher than those over forty; and that men were more likely (but only slightly) to respond than women. However, we also found that income was not a factor in response rate.

The tables also show that Easterners and Westerners responded better than Southerners and Midwesterners and that those of the Jewish faith filled out the second questionnaire with a greater rate of frequency than Protestants and Catholics.

Not surprisingly, those who said that they followed accounts of political affairs regularly and those who said that they were very well-informed on the Soviet Union had a higher response rate than those who did not follow regularly accounts of public affairs and those who said they were less than "very well-informed" about the Soviet Union, respectively.

Reading Tables II-3A and II-3B on motivation for travel to Russia, we find that those who look upon a trip to the Soviet Union as an intellectual endeavor (i.e., those who gave as their primary reason for travel "to talk with Soviet citizens", "to assess for myself the state of affairs in the USSR", or "to talk to Soviet counterparts in my field") had a higher rate of response than those who went primarily for what might be called tourist motivations (i.e., "to make a trip which represents a new kind of travel experience", or "to see the famous sights in the USSR").

Now that we know something about the characteristics of our sample, let us move on to the actual findings. What kinds of attitude change about the Soviet government, Soviet people, and Soviet society did our sample of American tourists have?

Chapter III

AMERICAN TRAVELERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

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AMERICAN TRAVELERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

"The national image is the last great stronghold of unsophistication .....Nations are divided into 'good' and 'bad'----the enemy is all bad, one's own nation is of spotless virtue."

---Kenneth Boulding

"Russia is the most interesting place on the planet."

---William Allen White

"There is no such thing as an expert on the Soviet Union. There are only varying degrees of ignorance."

---Anonymous

Did the sample of 549 Americans who traveled to the Soviet Union between the years 1965 and 1967 come back home with the same set of perceptions it took to Russia? The simple answer to that simple question is, "no". Much more complex is the extent to which various post-travel images differed from pre-travel images and the degree to which different groups within our sample differed from one another. We shall devote the rest of this dissertation to those questions.

Before looking at the actual findings, it is necessary to return to a point made earlier ---- i.e., that we made no claim that our sample is a cross-section of Americans. Indeed, we have no way of knowing to what extent our sample approximates a random sample of Americans visiting Russia. However, at the same time, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that, in fact, the kind of attitude change our sample experienced might not be representative of the attitude change that the whole population of American tourists going to Russia underwent.

In some of the chapters that follow, we will attempt to present some data relevant to this point. For the moment, however, we would like to leave it an open question.

General Reaction of Tourists

In this chapter, we will treat Americans' perceptions of the Soviet Union under three headings ---- the people, the government, and the system. There is some overlapping, to be sure, especially between the last two categories, but this is as convenient a method of ordering the data as any.

Like human beings, all survey questions are not born equal, and we asked two "general reaction" questions to which we attach a disproportionate amount of weight, because they subsume so many other questions.

On the post-travel questionnaire tourists were asked, "Would you say that your overall impression of the USSR has become more favorable or less favorable as a result of your trip?

TABLE III-1
Over-all Impression of the Soviet Union

	%	No.
1. Much more favorable	16	88
2. Somewhat more favorable	32	175
3. The same as before	20	107
4. Somewhat less favorable	21	114
5. Much more unfavorable	11	58

It should be noted that the above are self-perceptions of attitude change and may or may not closely correlate with real attitude change. To give a hypothetical example, perhaps Mr. "X" may have said that his impression was "much more unfavorable", even though he may have gone over with very negative expectations and found precisely what he expected. In short, his attitude didn't change at all. Nevertheless, we submit that data on self-perceptions of attitude change is no less important than data on objectively-measured attitude change. In the real world of the foreign policy decision-maker, for example, it may matter more what tourists think their attitude change is than what their objectively-measured attitude change is --- if, indeed, there is any substantial difference.

A look at Table III-1 shows that more persons feel they experience a favorable attitude change than an unfavorable one. If we collapse responses 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 4 and 5, on the other, we find that 48% say they have a more favorable impression of the USSR after travel, and 32% say they have a less favorable impression. Further, if we look at responses 1 and 5, the strongest possible positive and negative options, respectively, we find that 16% say their attitude is "much more favorable", compared to 11% who say their attitude is "much more unfavorable". Twenty per cent replied that they experienced no attitude change.

The fact that just one-fifth of our sample says that it returns home with the same impression it entered the Soviet Union is, in itself, interesting. Some of the literature on attitude change suggests that persons who experience attitude change in various experiments don't like to admit the change. The fact that 80% of our sample said that their attitudes did change probably reflects the fact that most persons made substantial intellectual, as well as monetary, investments in this trip --- and to say that they didn't change their attitudes is for many people the equivalent of saying that they didn't learn anything. It is important to remember that most of our respondents looked upon the trip to Russia as primarily a learning experience. (See the data on motivation for going in Chapter II.)

In a later chapter, we will relate a number of demographic and other variables to self-perceptions of attitude change.

In another "general reaction" type question, we asked respondents in the pre-travel questionnaire, "What do you think your reception in the Soviet Union will be like?" On the post-travel questionnaire, the tourists were asked, "What was your reception in the Soviet Union like?" Table III-2 shows the before and after responses.

TABLE III-2
Reception in the Soviet Union

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. Very friendly	28	48	148	251
2. Somewhat friendly	63	37	332	197
3. Indifferent	7	13	39	71
4. Somewhat hostile	2	1	8	7
5. Very hostile	0	0	0	1

Before Mean--- 1.823
After Mean--- 1.690

If we collapse responses 1 and 2, we find that 91% expected a friendly reception and that 85%, or a drop of 6%, actually found a friendly reception. However, the number of those who chose the most positive option possible, "Very friendly", increased from 28% to 48%. Further, only 1% found their reception "somewhat hostile" and zero per cent found their reception "very hostile", although the "indifferent" category increased from 7% to 13%.

One can make an educated guess that if a random sample of Americans were asked what kind of a reception they anticipated if they made a voyage to the Soviet Union, a significantly larger percentage than in our sample would have answered "somewhat hostile" of "very hostile". However, since travel to a given country is, in a sense, a self-selection process, one wouldn't expect that those who anticipated a hostile reception in Russia would be the ones most likely to travel there.

Perceptions of the Soviet People

The responses to the two "general reaction" questions indicate that our respondents experienced a somewhat favorable overall attitude change to the Soviet Union. We attribute this to the positive response of the Americans to the people of the Soviet Union. Although we found the normal number of ambiguities in parts of our data, one thing was quite unambiguous: Americans like Russians. (*footnote: As Ukrainians, Georgians, and Lithuanians would be the first to point out, all persons living in the Soviet Union are not Russians. There are, in fact, 140 different ethnic groups. As a shorthand device, however, we will often refer to the peoples of the Soviet Union as Russians. Further, the great majority of Soviets whom American tourists meet are Russians.)

As one tourist remarked, "I've never met a people that I argued with so much and loved so much."

The positive feeling--- and, indeed, the affection --- that Americans feel for Russians was most clearly demonstrated in the section of our questionnaire where we asked for open-ended responses. When respondents were asked what aspects of the Soviet Union they liked the most, "the people" was mentioned far more frequently than any other item. We will deal with the open-ended responses at the end of the chapter. In the meantime, let us examine the results of a semantic differential, in which thirteen sets of adjectives were given to the tourists, both before and after travel. They were asked to characterize the people of the Soviet Union in terms of the following adjectives:

Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Hostile
Cultured	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Uncultured
Wealthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Poor
Peace-loving	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Non-peace-loving
Kind	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Cruel
Strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak
Religious	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Athiestic
Democratic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Undemocratic
Just	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unjust
Progressive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Backward
Sincere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Insincere
Organized	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Disorganized
Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dishonest

Here are the results:

Semantic Differential on the Soviet People

TABLE III-3

Friendly-Hostile

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	18	31	88	151
2.	44	40	213	191
3.	25	17	119	80
4.	9	6	45	31
5.	3	5	14	23
6.	1	1	4	6
7.	0	0	0	1

BEFORE MEAN 2.370
AFTER MEAN 2.184

TABLE III-4

Cultured-Uncultured

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	5	4	23	21
2.	18	18	89	87
3.	26	26	125	127
4.	22	18	106	85
5.	18	16	86	77
6.	10	15	46	71
7.	1	3	7	14

BEFORE MEAN 3.641
AFTER MEAN 3.786

TABLE III-5

PEACE-LOVING ----NON-PEACE-LOVING

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	32	44	153	214
2.	39	39	191	188
3.	20	9	98	45
4.	6	6	29	31
5.	1	1	4	4
6.	2	0	8	2
7.	0	0	1	0

BEFORE MEAN	2.107
AFTER MEAN	1.820

TABLE III-6

KIND - CRUEL

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	12	16	56	78
2.	41	39	196	188
3.	22	19	106	92
4.	18	16	85	78
5.	5	7	23	33
6.	2	2	9	8
7.	1	0	3	1

BEFORE MEAN	2.711
AFTER MEAN	2.640

TABLE III-7

DEMOCRATIC - UNDEMOCRATIC

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	1	2	5	8
2.	10	9	49	41
3.	17	21	79	98
4.	34	31	159	145
5.	15	15	72	72
6.	14	14	65	66
7.	9	9	40	40

BEFORE MEAN	4.277
AFTER MEAN	4.260

TABLE III-8

JUST - UNJUST

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	9	7	41	33
2.	32	36	149	169
3.	26	23	120	109
4.	25	26	116	123
5.	6	4	26	18
6.	2	3	11	13
7.	0	0	2	0

BEFORE MEAN 2.752
AFTER MEAN 2.920

TABLE III-9

SINCERE - INSINCERE

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	15	21	72	98
2.	38	35	182	169
3.	23	21	109	99
4.	15	14	73	68
5.	4	6	20	28
6.	3	2	16	12
7.	1	1	5	3

BEFORE MEAN 2.696
AFTER MEAN 2.595

TABLE III-10

HONEST-DISHONEST

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	17	25	82	119
2.	38	36	183	173
3.	19	19	92	91
4.	19	13	89	63
5.	2	4	22	20
6.	2	2	9	9
7.	1	1	3	5

BEFORE MEAN 2.635
AFTER MEAN 2.456

If we look at the eight semantic differential tables dealing with affective adjectives, i.e. --- friendly-unfriendly, cultured-uncultured, peace-loving---non-peace-loving, cruel-kind, democratic-undemocratic, just-unjust, sincere-insincere, and honest-dishonest --- we see that in seven of the eight the Soviet people are placed on the positive half of the continuum. (Since 1 is the positive extreme and 7 is the negative extreme, any mean falling between 1 and 4 would be in the positive half of the continuum.) The only exception is the democratic-undemocratic adjective pair, where the after-travel mean is 4.255, or slightly below the mid-point.

On six of the eight affective adjective pairs, the respondents showed a favorable attitude change, the exceptions being cultured-uncultured and democratic-undemocratic. The biggest positive attitude change is in the perception of the Russians being peace-loving, followed by the perception of the Soviet people as being friendly and honest. In fact, the after-travel mean of 1.818 on the peace-loving---non-peace-loving semantic differential comes closest to the positive extreme of 1 of any of the perceptions that Americans had about the Soviet Union. Another interesting fragment of data which underlines pro-Soviet people attitude of American travelers is to be found in Table III-3. Whereas 18% of the respondents thought of Russians as being extremely friendly (category 1) before travel, 31% considered them to be extremely friendly after travel. Only 6% of the respondents thought of the Russians as being hostile in the after-travel questionnaire, and zero per cent put Russians in the "extremely hostile" category.

It may seem surprising that Americans have such a positive image of the citizenry of a country which, after all, has been America's most powerful antagonist for almost two-and-a-half decades. Indeed, other attitude surveys suggest that there is a strong correlation between the way respondents view a nation and its people. For example, when Germany and Japan were enemies of the United States, Americans had quite negative images of the peoples of those countries. Now that Germany and Japan are considered friendly countries, Americans have positive images of Germans and Japanese. To a lesser extent, the same rule applies to the American image of France. As President DeGaulle has continued to antagonize American public opinion, Gallup polls have shown Americans becoming more negative about the French people.

It might be more instructive to compare our findings with two surveys made of American public opinion about Russians. One was taken in 1942, when we were allies, and another was taken in 1948, when we were antagonists. In 1942, the ten adjectives most often picked by a sample of 1,200 Americans in describing Russians were:

Word	%
Hardworking	61
Brave	48
Ordinary	25
Radical	25
Progressive	24
Ignorant	20
Honest	19
Practical	18
Intelligent	16
Unimaginative	14
Warlike	14

(Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion, 1935 - 1946, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1951, p. 502.)

In 1948 a 12-word list was given to another sample of Americans, and from it they listed the following words in describing Russians:

Word	%
Cruel	50
Hardworking	49
Domineering	49
Backward	40
Brave	28
Conceited	28
Progressive	15
Self-controlled	14
Practical	13
Intelligent	12
Peace-loving	7
Generous	3

(William Buchanen and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1953, p. 47)

Seven of the adjectives were identical in the two surveys. Here is a comparison of the percentages for the seven adjectives in the two surveys:

Word	%	
	1942	1948
Hardworking	61	49
Intelligent	16	12
Practical	18	13
Conceited	3	28
Cruel	9	50
Brave	48	28
Progressive	24	15

One would be hard-pressed to make a case that the Russian people had changed that much in six years. (Note the 41% jump on "cruel".) A more plausible explanation is that American attitudes towards the Soviet Government changed perceptively, and this affected American attitudes towards the Soviet people.

A 1966 Gallup poll found these five adjectives most often used by the American people to describe the Russian people: 1. hard-working, 2. warlike, 3. intelligent, 4. progressive, and 5. treacherous. The two affective adjectives in the group ---"warlike" and "treacherous"--- are both negative.

As suggested above, foreign travel might be defined as a process of self-selection: those who feel quite negative about a country and its people are usually (but not always) those least likely to travel there. Although the Gallup survey is not really parallel to ours, it does give us some basis for making the most tentative kind of judgment that our sample felt more positive towards the Soviet people --- before the trip, as well as after --- than a cross-section of the American population would.

As we will see shortly, our sample had an overall negative image of the Soviet Government and system. In view of the fact that Americans in the past have generally not dichotomized between a government and its people, we feel it significant that our sample has tended to make the "people-good, government-bad" dichotomy. A large part of the explanation, no doubt, lies in the fact that our sample is in the upper socio-economic and education brackets and is, therefore, more capable of making sophisticated distinctions about foreign objects.

It probably will be no surprise to seasoned observers of the Soviet scene that our sample returns from the USSR with even more affirmative views of the Russian people than before travel. In most instances, they are probably responding to the spontaneous warmth that Russians show for Americans. As George Kennan once wrote:

"The fact is that throughout all these years of anti-capitalist and anti-American propaganda in the Soviet Union, the Soviet peoples have remained touchingly well-inclined toward the United States, touchingly unwilling to accept the endless efforts of their government to persuade them that Americans mean them no harm." (George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, p. 390.)

Philip Mosely has spoken of a sense of "unrequited love" toward America. (Philip Mosely, The Soviet Union, 1922-1962. New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 464.)

Author John Gunther, never one given to under-statement, probably summed up the views of many travelers when he said of the Russians:

"The Russians are a terrific, a tremendous, a magnificent people. In some respects they closely resemble Americans -- in good humour, robustness, curiosity, gregariousness." (John Gunther, Inside Russia Today, Harper, New York, 1957, p. xx.)

As Table III-16 makes clear, most Americans feel that Americans and Russians are basically more alike than different.

American and Russian People More Different or Alike?
Table III-16

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	Afte
1. They are much more alike than different.	27	30	145	159
2. They are somewhat more alike than different.	32	35	173	185
3. They are just about equally alike and different.	23	17	123	89
4. They are somewhat more different than alike.	14	14	74	74
5. They are much more different than alike.	4	5	20	28

If one collapses responses 1. and 2., on the one hand, and 4. and 5., on the other, one finds that 59% thought that Americans and Russian were more alike than different before travel and that 65% thought that they were more alike after travel. Only 18% thought that the peoples of the two countries were more different than alike before travel, a figure that increased by one per cent after travel.

Turning away from the affective component for a moment, we focus our attention on those adjective pairs which can be placed on a strength-weakness continuum: wealthy-poor, strong-weak, progressive-backward, and organized-disorganized.

TABLES III-11

WEALTHY-POOR

	% Before	% After	No. Before	No. After
1.	1	1	4	6
2.	4	5	20	22
3.	5	2	26	10
4.	12	6	58	31
5.	26	20	123	95
6.	39	42	185	220
7.	13	24	62	114

BEFORE MEAN -5.257
AFTER MEAN -5.600

TABLES III-12

STRONG-WEAK

	% Before	% After	No. Before	No. After
1.	14	13	67	63
2.	28	28	135	135
3.	20	20	96	93
4.	22	18	105	85
5.	8	7	37	33
6.	4	10	21	48
7.	3	4	13	17

BEFORE MEAN 3.052
AFTER MEAN 3.218

TABLE III-13

PROGRESSIVE-BACKWARD

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	3	1	15	6
2.	12	6	55	29
3.	19	18	89	83
4.	28	22	131	102
5.	22	24	102	112
6.	15	23	69	107
7.	3	7	13	35

BEFORE MEAN 4.073
AFTER MEAN 4.573

TABLE III-14

ORGANIZED-DISORGANIZED

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	4	5	21	25
2.	19	13	88	60
3.	18	14	86	68
4.	25	21	119	100
5.	17	15	81	71
6.	10	21	48	101
7.	6	10	31	49

BEFORE MEAN 3.883
AFTER MEAN 4.331

Looking at Tables III-11 through III-14 we find that Americans perceive the Soviet people as being more poor, more weak, more backward,and more disorganized in the post-travel survey. In fact, our sample evidences a greater shift towards the weakness pole of the strength-weakness continuum than they do towards the positive pole of the positive-negative continuum examined earlier. (We will have more to say about general perceptions of strength-weakness later on.)

Of the 13 semantic differentials on the Soviet people, the biggest difference between the "before" mean and "after" mean is on the one on "religious-athiestic". Clearly, our sample had a diminished image of Russians' religiosity after travel.

TABLE III-15

RELIGIOUS-ATHEISTIC

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	1	1	7	3
2.	8	4	37	17
3.	15	10	73	48
4.	25	15	122	74
5.	24	24	114	115
6.	20	34	98	162
7.	6	13	30	62

BEFORE MEAN	4.482
AFTER MEAN	5.110

If we collapse responses 1. through 3. and responses 5. through 7., we find that the percentage of Americans regarding Soviets as being religious dropped from 24% to 15%. The percentage of Americans perceiving Russians as being athiestic jumped from 50% to 71%.

Another question about the Soviet people revealed that Americans have a rather low estimate of Russians' knowledge about the United States. We received the following responses in reply to the question, "How accurately informed do you think that Soviet citizens are about conditions in the United States?"

TABLE III-18

	% Before	% After	No. Before	No. After
1. Very accurately informed	1	0	5	2
2. Somewhat accurately informed	9	15	48	78
3. Somewhat inaccurately informed	44	31	239	167
4. Very inaccurately informed	46	54	250	295

BEFORE MEAN 3.354
AFTER MEAN 3.392

The data is slightly ambiguous, in that the per cent thinking Russians are "somewhat accurately informed" increases from 9 to 15% in the after-travel questionnaire; at the same time the per cent regarding Russians as being "very inaccurately informed" increases from 46 to 54%. What is quite unambiguous is that the vast majority of our sample ---- 86% in all --- think the Russians are less than accurately informed about the USA.

Most of our sample would doubtless agree with Gunther's pithy description of Soviet misinformation about the US:

"First we must mention Soviet ignorances, which are formidable. Russians by and large think that only rich American boys go to college, and that the United States is totally run by big business. They honestly can't believe it when you tell them that President Eisenhower's father was a railway worker.... or that the New York Times prints verbatim the full texts of speeches by Soviet leaders, and that the United States has an advanced comprehensive social security system. It stuns them to hear that Americans do not need permission to travel from city to city, or that you do not need to submit a passport at a hotel. They cannot believe it that city police have no connection with the national government, or that Yale and Princeton are not operated by the state." (John Gunther, Inside Russia Today, op. cit, p. 74.)

We included one question in our questionnaire which focused on American perceptions of the Soviet image of us:

What Would You Say is the Image Which the Majority of the Soviet People Generally Hold of the American Government and People?

TABLE III-19

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. They like the American government and people	8	13	42	64
2. They like the government but dislike the people	0	0	2	3
3. They like the people but dislike the government	84	81	423	408
4. They don't like either	7	5	37	28

BEFORE MEAN 2.902
AFTER MEAN 2.795

In looking at the responses in the above table, one is tempted to put forward the "mirror image" hypothesis. That is, just as our sample tends to make the "people-good, government-bad" dichotomy (granted that this is a gross over-simplification on our part), so they project Soviet citizens making the same dichotomy about us.

When asked, "Would that the Soviet government is popular with the majority of its people?", our respondents answered in the following manner:

Popularity of Soviet Government with Its Own People

TABLE III-20

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. Very popular	14	16	72	86
2. Somewhat popular	40	36	207	187
3. Not particularly popular or unpopular	33	34	172	177
4. Somewhat unpopular	12	12	64	65
5. Very unpopular	2	2	8	8

BEFORE MEAN 2.481
AFTER MEAN 2.461

We are not going to attempt to make a case for the accuracy of our sample's assessment of Soviet government popularity. Indeed, the average American tourist who spends ten days in the USSR on a group tour and who speaks no Russian will have much less basis for making a judgment on the government's popularity than he will, for example, on a subject like the friendliness of the Russian people. However, as we have argued before, reality is often less important than perceptions of reality.

However accurate or inaccurate our respondents may be, they see the Soviet people as neither wildly enthusiastic nor wildly unenthusiastic about their government. Indeed, if our sample had been asked to assess Lyndon Johnson's popularity with the American people at the same time, the Soviet government would probably have scored better than the Johnson Administration.

As Table III-20 shows, our sample's opinions on Soviet government popularity shift only slightly.

We now turn to perceptions of the Soviet government by our respondents.

Perceptions of the Soviet Government

In order to assess to what extent, if, at all, Americans made distinctions between the Soviet government and people, our semantic differential on the Soviet government was composed of the identical set of thirteen adjective-pairs found in the semantic differential on the Soviet people. Here are the results:

Semantic Differential on the Soviet Government

TABLE III-21

FRIENDLY - HOSTILE

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	0	2	0	9
2.	4	6	20	26
3.	15	18	72	82
4.	19	17	90	79
5.	28	25	129	125
6.	26	25	123	115
7.	7	7	33	31

BEFORE MEAN	4.775
AFTER MEAN	4.614

TABLE III-22

CULTURED-UNCULTURED

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	1	5	17	21
2.	17	17	78	79
3.	24	22	110	103
4.	29	20	134	91
5.	16	19	76	89
6.	10	14	46	67
7.	1	3	4	15

BEFORE MEAN	3.705
AFTER MEAN	3.879

TABLE III-23

PEACE-LOVING--NON-PEACE-LOVING

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	2	3	11	16
2.	11	16	53	74
3.	18	18	84	83
4.	25	22	119	103
5.	19	19	89	87
6.	16	16	75	83
7.	8	7	35	32

BEFORE MEAN	4.271
AFTER MEAN	4.106

TABLE III-24

KIND-CRUEL

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1,	1	1	4	3
2.	7	8	31	36
3.	15	13	70	62
4.	28	26	131	119
5.	22	26	100	119
6.	19	9	89	86
7.	8	8	36	36

BEFORE MEAN 4.524
AFTER MEAN 4.555

TABLE III-25

DEMOCRATIC-UNDEMOCRATIC

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	2	1	11	5
2.	3	2	16	8
3.	3	2	15	10
4.	3	6	13	30
5.	8	9	36	41
6.	33	34	154	157
7.	48	47	223	217

BEFORE MEAN 5.993
AFTER MEAN 6.061

TABLE III-26

JUST-UNJUST

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	2	13	8	60
2.	7	21	33	97
3.	15	18	69	84
4.	26	28	122	132
5.	19	12	89	56
6.	21	7	98	31
7.	10	2	47	7

BEFORE MEAN 4.572
AFTER MEAN 4.684

TABLE III-27

SINCERE-INSINCERE

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	6	4	28	17
2.	8	12	39	56
3.	12	11	57	52
4.	19	18	90	85
5.	17	16	78	76
6.	22	22	105	105
7.	15	16	70	76

BEFORE MEAN	4.597
AFTER MEAN	4.640

TABLE III-28

HONEST-DISHONEST

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	2	2	10	11
2.	7	9	34	40
3.	10	9	36	46
4.	25	26	117	123
5.	18	21	85	99
6.	24	18	111	86
7.	15	14	69	67

BEFORE MEAN	4.783
AFTER MEAN	4.663

A glance at the preceding eight tables shows that our respondents travel to the Soviet Union with a somewhat negative image of the Soviet government and return with a like image.

Of the eight affective adjective pairs, only on one ---- cultured - uncultured ---- does the government come out on the positive side of the ledger. The sample views the Russian government as being highly undemocratic.

The after-travel mean of 6.063 comes close to the negative extreme of 7. The other negative evaluations --- reading from most negative to least negative -- are: unjust, dishonest, insincere, unfriendly, cruel, and non-peace-loving. It is important to point out, however, that the after-travel means on these six adjectives range between 4.684 (unjust) and 4.108 (non-peace-loving). Since the mid-point on the scale is 4, the overall evaluation with respect to these six adjectives is only mildly negative.

Our travelers showed a positive attitude change on three of the adjective pairs: peace-loving--non-peace-loving, friendly-hostile, and honest-dishonest. They experienced a negative attitude change on the other five: cultured-uncultured, just-unjust, democratic-undemocratic, sincere-insincere, and kind-cruel.

Several observations are in order:

One, interestingly enough, the most negative attitude change is registered on the one adjective-pair in which the after-travel mean is in the positive half of the continuum: cultured-uncultured.

Two, although a negative attitude change occurred on five of the eight adjective pairs, the sum of the positive attitude change on the other three slightly exceeded the sum of the negative change of the five.

Three, with respect to the perception of the Soviet government as being highly undemocratic, it is important to bear in mind a point made earlier: Human beings hold different views with differing degrees of conviction. Travelers enter a foreign country relatively open to attitude change on some questions, relatively closed on others.

It is doubtful that there was any question on which our respondents were less open to attitude change than on the subject of the Soviet government being undemocratic. We are not making any judgment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of their perception. We are only pointing out that from an early age, Americans learn a "truism" --- that the Soviet government is undemocratic. We learn this in school, at home, and through the various media. This notion is reinforced in innumerable ways and innumerable number of times. Thus, American travelers to Russia would have to be presented with an overwhelming amount of evidence that the government is, in fact, democratic in order to change their views. Apparently, the tourists failed to perceive such evidence. As Table III-25 shows, the change was a slightly negative one. (This is a good example of "congruent attitude change", which we will discuss in the conclusion.)

Four, as a look at Table III-29 shows, there is a definite tendency to dichotomize between people and government. The respondents gave a positive rating to the Russian people on seven out of eight adjective pairs and a negative rating to the government on seven out of eight. Further, as noted before, the direction of change was more frequently positive for the people and negative for the government.

TABLE III-29

Positive-Negative Affect Perceptions
Comparison of "Before" and "After" Means for People and Government

	Adjective Pair	Before	After	Total Change
People	Friendly-Hostile	*P2.369	P2.181	P.188
Govt.	Friendly-Hostile	N4.775	N4.614	P.161
People	Cultured-Uncultured	P3.641	P3.786	N.145
Govt.	Cultured-Uncultured	P3.705	P3.879	N.174
People	Peace-loving--Non-peace-loving	P.2107	P1.818	P.289
Govt.	Peace-loving--Non-peace-loving	N4.271	N4.106	P.165
People	Kind-Cruel	P2.712	P2.637	P.075
Govt.	Kind-Cruel	N4.524	N4.555	N.031
People	Democratic-Undemocratic	N4.277	N4.255	N.022
Govt.	Democratic-Undemocratic	N5.993	N6.061	N.068
People	Just-Unjust	P2.953	P2.919	P.034
Govt.	Just-Unjust	N4.572	N4.684	N.112
People	Sincere-Insincere	P2.696	P2.600	P.096
Govt.	Sincere-Insincere	N4.597	N4.640	N.043
People	Honest-Dishonest	P2.633	P2452	P.181
Govt.	Honest-Dishonest	N4.783	N4.663	P.120

(*Note: When "P" precedes the before-travel or after-travel mean, it signifies that the mean is in the "positive" side of the continuum. When "N" precedes the mean, it signifies that it is in "negative" side of the continuum. In the "Total Change" column, "P" and "N" refer to the direction of change.)

Thus, the sample dichotomized more after travel than before. On a continuum with a range of 6, the after-travel means for "people" averaged 1.7 higher than the after-travel means for "government". As noted earlier, previous studies suggest that the normal pattern is for a population not to dichotomize between a foreign government and people.

Five, Table III-29 shows that the three adjective pairs on which there is the most positive attitude change in the "people" category are the same three in which there is a positive attitude change toward the government. In each of the three --- peace-loving--non-peace-loving, friendly-hostile, and honest-dishonest --- the positive attitude change toward the people is greater than the positive attitude change toward the government.

We will resist the temptation of straying too far from the data and concluding that it is the positive response toward the people that "jacks up" the government scores on some questions. Yet, we do posit this as a plausible hypothesis.

Six, the most positive attitude change --- toward both the people and the government --- was registered on "peace-loving". This will come as little surprise to most veteran travelers in the Soviet Union. Most first-time visitors to the Soviet Union are taken back by the degree of passion with which ordinary Russians speak about the need for peace between the U.S. and USSR. Even Intourist guides, most of whom will speak with passion about nothing else (their canned oft-repeated excursion speeches resemble the wooden routines of tourist guides all over the world), will speak with fervor about the importance of peace. Russians will point out --- correctly so --- that the American mainland was untouched during World War II while the Soviets suffered approximately 37,500,000 casualties, including almost 12,000,000 deaths, and that more than 70,000 towns and villages were destroyed.

TABLE III-30

WEALTHY-POOR

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	3	4	13	17
2.	12	13	55	61
3.	22	20	103	93
4.	24	20	114	92
5.	22	18	103	86
6.	15	19	71	91
7.	2	6	10	29

BEFORE MEAN 4.049
AFTER MEAN 4.189

TABLE III-31

STRONG-WEAK

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	32	36	153	171
2.	41	35	193	167
3.	12	11	57	51
4.	8	9	38	43
5.	4	5	18	25
6.	2	2	10	12
7.	1	1	3	4

BEFORE MEAN 2.188
AFTER MEAN 2.227

TABLE III-32

PROGRESSIVE-BACKWARD

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	8	4	37	17
2.	21	14	99	66
3.	26	26	120	119
4.	19	19	90	88
5.	12	18	54	81
6.	12	15	57	68
7.	2	6	8	26

BEFORE MEAN 3.490
AFTER MEAN 3.985

TABLE III-33

ORGANIZED-DISORGANIZED

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	26	22	123	105
2.	33	29	156	138
3.	12	10	56	46
4.	13	10	61	48
5.	8	14	36	67
6.	6	8	29	40
7.	3	6	113	30

BEFORE MEAN	2.725
AFTER MEAN	3.156

Tables III-30 through III-33 relate to perceptions of strength-weakness. The data is quite unambiguous. In all four tables, we observe a change in the "weakness" direction. Our respondents returned from the Soviet Union feeling that the government was more poor, more weak, more backward, and more disorganized than they had anticipated. Yet, it is important to point out that on three of the four adjective pairs, the after-travel mean was still on the "strength" side of the continuum. In sum, the respondents felt the Soviet government was relatively "strong", but not as "strong" as in their pre-travel image.

The biggest changes in the weakness-direction were "progressive-backward" (.485) and "organized-disorganized" (.431).

Based on comments of tourists, a plausible explanation for the change might be the following: American travelers arrive in the USSR having read a great deal about remarkable achievements in industrialization since the October Revolution and about brilliant Soviet space triumphs. They have an image of the Soviet Union as a place "where things work" and where the standard of living is relatively high. Then they see the relatively shoddy consumer goods and clothing; they stay in hotels where the elevators are periodically breaking down and where there are no stoppers for sinks; and they have brushes with an Intourist bureaucracy which can be excruciatingly inefficient. In short, a country which many thought of as being "ten feet tall" was cut down to size after a visit there.

Further, it must be remembered that the respondents were specifically asked in the questionnaire to look at the Soviet Union "from the vantage point of American society".

TABLE III-34

Strength-Weakness Perceptions
Comparison of "Before"and "After" Means for People and Government

		Before	After	Total Change
People	Wealthy-Poor	*W5.257	W5.600	W.343
Govt.	Wealthy-Poor	W4.049	W4.189	W.140
People	Strong-Weak	S3.052	S3.218	W.166
Govt.	Strong-Weak	S2.188	S2.227	W.039
People	Progressive-Backward	W4.073	W4.573	W.500
Govt.	Progressive-Backward	S3.490	S3.985	W.495
People	Organized-Disorganized	S3.883	W4.331	W.448
Govt.	Organized-Disorganized	S2.725	S3.156	W.431

*(Note: When "W" precedes the before-travel or after-travel mean, it signifies that the mean is in the "weakness" side of the continuum. When "S" precedes the mean, it signifies that it is in the "strength" side of the continuum. In the "Total Change",column, "W" refers to the direction of change.)

When we looked at perceptions of positive-negative affect, we found that our sample made the "government-bad, people-good" dichotomy. In examining perceptions of strength-weakness on the semantic differential, we find that our sample had an image of the government as being moderately "strong" and the people as being moderately "weak". That is, three out of four of the after-travel means for "government" were on the "strength" side of the continuum, and three out of four of the after-travel means for "people" were on the "weakness" side of the continuum. However, in each of the eight adjective pairings, the movement was in the "weakness" direction. The direction of attitude change was parallel with regard to "government" and "people", but the intensity of attitude change was somewhat greater with respect to people.

Soviet Government Viewed as Atheistic

As Table III-35 shows, American travelers perceive the Soviet government as being extremely atheistic. The figure of 84% which considers the government "atheistic" before travel is bloated to 96% after travel. Further, those who consider the government extremely atheistic (7) jump from 59% to 75%. The after-travel mean of 6.565 is the closest to the polar extreme of 7 of any of the semantic differentials in the questionnaire.

TABLE III-35

RELIGIOUS--ATHEISTIC

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	2	2	10	8
2.	2	1	11	4
3.	3	1	15	6
4.	3	0	14	2
5.	5	3	25	12
6.	25	18	120	85
7.	59	75	279	357

BEFORE MEAN 6.183
AFTER MEAN 6.565

It may be recalled that the sample also considered the Soviet people atheistic (Table III-15 on page 55), but the after-travel mean of 5.110 for "people" was not nearly as extreme as the mean of 6.565 for "government".

The direction of attitude change was the same, but the intensity was greater for "people" --- .628 compared to .382. (Note: We did not include "religious-atheistic" in the positive-negative affect category, because whether being religious is a positive or negative value depends upon the eye of the beholder.)

Perceptions of the Soviet System

We turn now to our sample's perceptions of the Soviet system. We will give a very broad interpretation to the word "system" and will include under this heading perceptions of various aspects of Soviet society.

We asked our respondents: "From the vantage point of American society, what kind of impression of conditions in the Soviet Union would you say you had in the following areas?" We then listed ten aspects of Soviet society and instructed the respondents to circle a number between one and five. They were told that 1 meant "very favorable"; 2,"somewhat favorable"; 3 "neither favorable nor unfavorable"; 4, "somewhat unfavorable"; and 5, "very unfavorable".

The results are found in Tables III-36 through III-45:

TABLE III-36

EDUCATION

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	30	24	142	115
2.	51	49	244	233
3.	10	11	50	54
4.	8	13	37	64
5.	1	3	5	12

BEFORE MEAN 1.993
AFTER MEAN 2.215

TABLE III-37

AGRICULTURE

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	1	1	7	6
2.	12	9	56	41
3.	13	18	60	83
4.	47	37	220	175
5.	27	35	127	165

BEFORE MEAN 3.859
AFTER MEAN 3.961

TABLE III-38

RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	38	38	172	176
2.	32	31	148	142
3.	22	20	102	92
4.	6	9	29	42
5.	2	1	7	6

BEFORE MEAN 2.019
AFTER MEAN 2.039

TABLE III-39

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	4	7	17	34
2.	15	21	72	99
3.	15	7	71	31
4.	41	29	192	136
5.	26	37	121	173

BEFORE MEAN 3.693
AFTER MEAN 3.665

TABLE III-40

CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	21	22	99	101
2.	45	36	212	168
3.	19	20	90	92
4.	12	15	58	70
5.	2	7	8	35

BEFORE MEAN 2.280
AFTER MEAN 2.505

TABLE III-41

CONSUMER GOODS

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	0	0	2	2
2.	3	4	16	17
3.	11	4	54	18
4.	44	31	207	147
5.	41	61	194	289

BEFORE MEAN 4.215
AFTER MEAN 4.488

TABLE III-42

SOCIAL WELFARE

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	18	20	85	94
2.	37	39	171	178
3.	26	20	119	92
4.	13	15	59	68
5.	6	6	27	29

BEFORE MEAN 2.505
AFTER MEAN 2.479

TABLE III-43

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	10	21	46	96
2.	32	29	143	129
3.	43	35	195	155
4.	12	12	55	54
5.	2	3	9	14

BEFORE MEAN	2.638
AFTER MEAN	2.446

TABLE III-44

FREEDOM FOR INDIVIDUAL

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	0	0	2	0
2.	2	2	10	11
3.	6	5	28	26
4.	32	34	152	156
5.	59	59	281	280

BEFORE MEAN	4.479
AFTER MEAN	4.490

TABLE III-45

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1.	1	0	4	1
2.	2	3	11	13
3.	6	6	28	30
4.	33	29	159	139
5.	58	62	275	294

BEFORE MEAN	4.446
AFTER MEAN	4.493

Before discussing the above data, we want to put forward two related tables: Table III-46 gives a comparison of the before-travel and after-travel means on the ten aspects of the Soviet system; and Table III-47 gives a rank order of the ten items from most favorable to most unfavorable, as perceived by the tourists after travel.

TABLE III-46

Comparison of "Before" and "After" Means on Aspects of Soviet System

	"Before" Mean	"After" Mean	Change
Education	P1.993	P2.215	N.222
Agriculture	N3.859	N3.961	N.102
Rate of Unemployment	P2.019	P2.039	N.020
Housing Construction	N3.693	N3.665	P.128
Cultural Achievements	P2.280	P2.505	N.225
Consumer Goods	N4.215	N4.488	N.273
Social Welfare	P2.505	P2.479	P.026
Juvenile Delinquency	P2.638	P2.446	P.192
Freedom for the Individual	N4.479	N4.490	N.011
Religious Freedom	N4.446	N4.493	N.047

*(Note: The "P" preceding the before-travel or after-travel mean signifies that the mean is in the positive half of the continuum. When "N" precedes the mean, this signifies that it is on the negative side of the midpoint. The "P" or "N" preceding the figure in the "Change" column refers to the direction of change.)

TABLE III-47

After-Travel Perceptions of Aspects of Soviet System Ranked from Most Favorable to Most Unfavorable

		After-Travel Mean	
1.	Unemployment	*2.039	
2.	Education	2.215	↑
3.	Juvenile Delinquency	2.446	Favorable
4.	Social Welfare	2.479	↓
5.	Culture	2.505	
6.	Housing	3.665	
7.	Agriculture	3.961	↑
8.	Consumer Goods	4.488	Unfavorable
9.	Freedom for the Individual	4.490	
10.	Freedom of Religion	4.493	↓

(Note: The positive pole is 1 and the negative pole is 5.)

Several observations are in order:

As Tables III-46 and III-47 show, our respondents place five of the items on the "favorable" half of the continuum and five on the "unfavorable" half. However, as we see in Table III-46, the travelers experience a negative attitude change on seven of the ten. The seven categories, ranked from the most negative change to the least negative, are: consumer goods, cultural achievements, education, agriculture, religious freedom, rate of unemployment, and freedom for the individual. The changes on the last three, however, were quite minor. The positive changes, in rank order, were in these categories: juvenile delinquency, housing construction, and social welfare.

A glance at Table III-47 above shows that the aspects of Soviet society most favorably perceived generally fall into the broad "social" category. The two items at the bottom of the list generally fall into a "political" category. It should be noted that the after-travel means of 4.4 for "freedom of religion", "freedom for the individual", and "consumer goods" come quite close to the negative extreme of 5.

Probably the most striking of the tables on the ten aspects of Soviet society is Table III-41 on consumer goods. This table shows that the per cent checking 5, the most negative option, jumps from 41% before travel to 61% after travel. Only 4% have a "somewhat favorable" opinion of consumer goods in the Soviet Union after travel.

The response to another question underlines how far below the tourists' expectations the Soviet standard of living was. The respondents were asked:

"Soviet leaders say that the Soviet Union will catch up with and surpass the United States in the standard of living for the people. Do you think that the USSR will surpass the US within the next 20 years?"

Here are the answers:

TABLE III-48

Will the USSR Catch Up with the US in Standard of Living?

		%		No.	
		Before	After	Before	After
1.	Definitely	0	1	2	3
2.	Probably	4	4	23	22
3.	Probably not	50	30	276	166
4.	Definitely not	45	65	246	355

BEFORE MEAN 3.400
AFTER MEAN 3.598

We see in the above table that the per cent believing that the Soviet Union will "definitely not" surpass the United States in the standard of living in the next twenty years leaps from 45% to 65%. When we examine the open-ended responses shortly, we will see the reasons for this significant change.

While designing the questionnaire, we made an assumption that the great majority of Americans visiting the Soviet Union wouldn't enjoy living there. (It's a nice place to visit, but....") If our assumption was correct, we were intrigued to find out whether the generally-negative image Americans have of the USSR is due to primarily political or economic reasons --- or both. We asked the travelers the following question:

"If you had to live your life in the Soviet Union, do you think that you would find it more difficult to live under the political conditions or the economic conditions of that country?"

TABLE III-49

Political or Economic Conditions Most Difficult to Live under in USSR?

		%		No.	
		Before	After	Before	After
1.	Political conditions	40	31	218	171
2.	Economic conditions	14	12	78	66
3.	Both equally	45	55	243	303
4.	Neither would be difficult	1	1	7	6

We observe in the above table a decrease in the percentages of persons checking "political conditions" and "economic conditions" alone and a ten per cent increase for the "both equally" option. Further, only 1%, or 6 people out of 546 who answered the question, thought "Neither would be difficult."

More than one interpretation can be made of the 10% increase in "both equally", but the most sensible explanation, it seems to us, is not that Americans found political conditions less onerous than expected, but that they found economic conditions (more specifically, the standard of living) more onerous than expected. Other data on standard of living and consumer goods presented in this chapter supports this hypothesis.

Open-Ended Responses

As anyone familiar with survey research knows, a closed questionnaire is a convenient and economical instrument for obtaining a great deal of data. It does have the disadvantage, however, of "flattening the empirical landscape." That is, the real world is not quite as orderly as the neat categories of a multiple-choice question.

In order to allow the respondents to express what was uppermost in their minds, we included in the post-travel questionnaire some open-ended sections. Coding and processing open-ended responses can, of course, be difficult and time-consuming, but we found it well worth the effort. The open-ended responses tended to validate --- as well as elaborate on --- our findings in the closed questions. (Ideally, we should have had a proper sample of depth-interviews, but the limited resources at hand did not allow us to hire a team of interviewers.)

Two of the open-ended questions read as follows:

(1) "What aspects of the Soviet Union did you like the most?"

(2) "What aspects of the Soviet Union did you dislike the most?"

The great majority of respondents listed between two and four positive and negative items each. Only rarely were more than five mentioned. The basic units in the tables below are the number of items mentioned rather than the number of respondents.

TABLE III-50

Aspects of the Soviet Union Liked Most (A)

		%	No.
1.	People	34	528
2.	Cultural - Aesthetic	32	494
3.	Economic	16	245
4.	Social	12	195
5.	Other	3	44
6.	No response	2	32

The data for the above table was gathered from the question about aspects of the Soviet Union liked most, plus a request at the end of the questionnaire for general comments about the Soviet Union. Table III-51 gives a more detailed breakdown on the responses to the question, "What aspects of the Soviet Union did you like the most?"

Aspects of the Soviet Union Liked Most (B)

		No.
1.	People	316
2.	Culture	257
3.	Social Welfare/Education	136
4.	Transportation	104
5.	Cleanliness	84
6.	Economy*	68
7.	Creature Comforts**	35
8.	Parks	35
9.	Politics*	30
10.	Housing	29
11.	Intourist	25
12.	Desire for Peace	22
13.	Little Crime	20
14.	Emphasis on Youth	15
15.	Physical Education	14
16.	Morality	9
17.	Vacation Resorts	5
18.	Other	14

(Note: *The categories "economy" or "politics" refer not to respondents' attachment to the economic or political system as a whole, but usually to some narrow-gauge aspect of those systems such as "low taxation." **"Creature comforts" refers to amenities of living that the tourists themselves experience in hotels, restaurants, etc., whereas "standard of living" which appears in the next table, refers to the standard of living of the Soviet citizens themselves.)

Turning now to the negative, we find that the principal dislikes of the respondents fall into the following categories:

TABLE III-51

Aspects of the Soviet Union Disliked Most (A)

		%	No.
1.	Political	42	710
2.	Economic	34	583
3.	People	11	181
4.	Drabness	4	62
5.	Other	9	146

Following is a more detailed breakdown of negative impressions:

TABLE III-52

Aspects of the Soviet Union Disliked Most (B)

		No.
1.	Political (various specific complaints)	327
2.	Consumer goods/standard of living	167
3.	Lack of freedom	145
4.	Creature comforts (for tourists)	109
5.	Economic (various specific complaints)	106
6.	*People	105
7.	Drabness	77
8.	Housing	68
9.	Disorganization/Inefficiency	60
10.	Intourist	60
11.	State of religion	54
12.	Too much crowding	20
13.	Lack of cleanliness	19
14.	Social Welfare/Education	18
15.	Transportation	16
16.	Worship of Lenin	14
17.	Surveillance of tourist	13
18.	Cultural	12
19.	Black marketeers	10
20.	No nightlife	10
21.	Other	20

(*Note: A negative reference to "people" was usually in the form of a particular characteristic which the respondent didn't like, i.e., "They're too darn athiestic.")

Before setting down a number of typical comments from tourists which "flesh out" the above tables, and before adding our own comments, we want to invite attention to a set of related tables below.

It may be recalled that early in this chapter (Table III-1 on page 41) we printed the results on a question about respondents' over-all impression of the Soviet Union. Sixteen per cent said their impression was "much more favorable" than expected; 32% said "somewhat more favorable;" 20%, "the same as before;" 21%, "somewhat less favorable;" and 11%, "much more unfavorable."

Immediately after asking respondents whether their overall impression was more favorable or less favorable as a result of the trip, we asked for an open-ended reply to this question: "In what specific ways has it become either more favorable or unfavorable?"

The categories for Tables III-53 and III-55 are the same as for Tables III-49 and III-51 (aspects of the Soviet Union liked and disliked most, respectively). The crucial difference is that in the answers reflected in the tables below, the respondents were pinpointing the key factors which led to either positive or negative attitude change.

Table III-53

Factors Which Led to Favorable Attitude Change (A)

	%	No.
1. People	56	261
2. Economic	14	64
3. Cultural	12	57
4. Social	6	28
5. Other	12	55

In Table III-54 we present a partial breakdown of the factors leading to favorable attitude change.

Table III-54

Factors Which Led to Favorable Attitude Change (B)

	No.
1. People	186
2. Economic	51
3. Political	46
4. Desire for Peace	37
5. Social Welfare/Education	36
6. Cultural	23
7. Housing	10
8. Transportation	7
9. Creature comforts	7
10. Intourist	5
11. Other	16

We now shift attention to the key factors responsible for a negative attitude change.

TABLE III-55

Factors Which Led to an Unfavorable Attitude Change (A)

	%	No.
1. Political	45	216
2. Economic	30	147
3. People	14	67
4. Drabness	4	21
5. Other	6	27

Before commenting on these tables, we present the final table of this chapter, Table III-56, which is a partial breakdown of the factors listed in Table III-56.

TABLE III-56

Factors Which Led to an Unfavorable Attitude Change (B)

	No.
1. Political	109
2. Lack of freedom	47
3. Economic	46
4. Consumer goods/standard of living	44
5. People	40
6. Drabness	21
7. Housing	19
8. State of religion	17
9. Disorganization	13
10. Intourist	10
11. Social Welfare/Education	9
12. Creature comforts	9
13. Uncleanliness	5
14. Other	16

Especially interesting is a comparison of Tables III-49 (page 77) and III-53 (page 82). In Table III-49, "Aspects of the Soviet Union Liked Most," we see "people" leading the list with 34% of the responses. "Cultural" is a close second with 32%. However, when our respondents were asked to isolate those key factors which led to a favorable attitude change (when, in fact, there was a self-perception of a favorable attitude change), "people" was listed in 56% of the responses, with "economic" and "cultural" factors a distant second and third, with 14% and 12%, respectively. Table III-53, then, presents as potent evidence as we have that the most glorious asset the Soviet Union has --- at least from the point of view of the tourist --- is the warmth and friendliness of its people.

Conversely, when travelers say they experience negative attitude change in the Soviet Union, they attribute political factors as being more important than economic factors. When respondents were asked to list the crucial factors which led to unfavorable attitude change (in those cases where there was unfavorable attitude change) political factors were named in 45% of the responses and economic factors in 30% of the responses.

This is an interesting finding in view of data previously presented in this chapter. It may be recalled that on most questions about political factors our respondents tended to shift slightly in a negative direction. That is, they went to the Soviet Union with rather negative attitudes about the political system and had their pre-conceptions confirmed. They moved considerably more in a negative direction on economic aspects of the system. They found consumer goods shoddy and the standard of living significantly lower than expected. Nevertheless, although there was a greater negative attitude change on economic than on political aspects of the system, those tourists who said their overall attitude towards the Soviet Union was more unfavorable after travel pinpointed political factors one-and-a-half times as often as economic factors for the change.

A possible explanation for this is that political attitudes which were mainly intellectualized before travel were given emotional content as a result of the trip. We offer this as an hypothesis worthy of further study.

So far, we have presented fifty-two tables in this chapter alone. The use of tables, as we all know, is an indispensable way of presenting a great deal of data in a small amount of space. It is hard to imagine a piece of survey research without them. Tables, however, have one intrinsic weakness: they are skeletons and not flesh. They lack feeling, animation, emotion. No set of tables ever won a Pulitzer Prize for literature. For the remainder of this chapter, then, we intend to "flesh-out" the skeleton. In order to give the reader a better feeling for the data read in the tables, we present below a rough cross-sample of comments written by our respondents. We will especially focus on examples of oft-repeated themes, such as love of the Russian people and dislike for aspects of the political system.

Favorable Comments About the Soviet Union

People

A housewife: "I was impressed by the fantastic friendliness of the people.... Couldn't have believed it without seeing it."

A female teacher: "I appreciated the Soviet people's love of nature."

A male student: "I found that the Russians wanted peace more than anything."

A female editorial worker: "Russians are generally extraordinarily handsome. The children look as if they are straight out of a Pet Milk ad. .... Russians were so friendly and helpful. In Moscow, I was lost one rainy evening, and three Russians (I did not ask them to do this) walked with me for an hour-and-a-half looking for the place I was trying to find. .... The gaiety and spontaneity of Russians at parties is something Americans should appreciate and learn themselves."

An engineer: "I was encouraged by how similar their students were to our good young people."

A male student: "Personally, I don't like communism, but I love the people of Russia."

A dentist: "I never met such friendly people in my life."

A lawyer: "I liked the cultural awareness of Soviet people, their eagerness to read literature, listen to concerts and lectures, and to visit art museums."

A male teacher: "There's a lovely transparent quality about the Russian people. When they are happy, they are beautifully happy. When they are sad, they don't try to hide it. They can be rude and boorish, but at their best they display an incomparable warmth, spontaneity, and generosity of spirit."

A woman medical worker: "I was struck by the Russians' desire for peace. This terror of war is not received from brain-washing from the government. This comes from the hearts of the people, and one must treat it with respect. For they have experienced war on their own soil and Americans haven't since the Civil War."

Cultural-Aesthetic

A businessman: "I was struck by the beauty of onion-domed cathedrals and the old buildings."

A bio-chemist: "The Bolshoi Opera and ballet were magnificent."

A male teacher: "I liked the fact that the government makes cultural activities available to all the people at a relatively low price, or, in many instances, for free."

A male student: "I was impressed by the average Russian's knowledge of literature and music.... also, the way they enjoyed their parks."

A male teacher: "..... the culture, as reflected by the Bolshoi and the Hermitage Museum.... Also, the inexpensiveness of books and records."

A female student: "I loved the beauty of the countryside and the fact that people appreciated nature."

A housewife: ".... the cleanliness of the cities, especially Moscow."

A businessman: "It is my feeling that the cultural aspect overshadows all else. Its accessibility for the people is exceeded only by its grandeur."

An engineer: "I liked the fact that a large area of Soviet cities I visited was devoted to parks. Kiev, a beautiful green city, was especially impressive in this respect. We Americans can learn something from the Soviets when it comes to preserving large parts of our cities to parks."

Other Favorable Comments

A female student: "I was impressed by the important role that children play in the society."

A businessman: "I had expected to visit a very backward, non-industrialized country, as reported by the American press and instead was favorably impressed by the state of the economy."

A female student: "I had doubted that there would be as much free individual expression as I found."

A clergyman: "I liked the extensive and effective medical care program, including preventitive emphasis. .... Also, the attempt to provide decent housing for all people."

An industrial engineer: "I was impressed by the opportunities provided for the people for participation in sports."

A businessman: "... the efficient public transportation system, especially the Moscow subway."

A female journalist: "Russia doesn't have juvenile delinquency and crime like the United States does. I was never afraid to walk in the cities of Russia after dark. I wouldn't dare do it in my upper-middle class neighborhood in Baltimore."

A male (occupation not given): "I was surprised at the educational system, which seems to be set up to help everyone according to ability."

A vetinarian: "I felt that the system is in the process of permitting more freedom and more self-expression."

A housewife: "I didn't get the feeling that I was in a police state."

A businessman: "The Intourist personnel were quite friendly, efficient and knowledgeable about Russian culture. These guides knocked themselves out trying to make certain that everyone enjoyed themselves."

A banker: "The transportation system was wonderful ---- the buses, the trams, the cheap subway fares, the inexpensive air transportation."

A male teacher: "... the cleanliness of the cities."

Unfavorable Comments About the Soviet Union

Political

A woman medical technician: "In Russia there is little, if any, personal privacy. Your business is everyone else's. In other words, the communist system is complete. This, I hate. On the beach at Sochi there is a huge sign saying, "LOVE THE SUN."

A male student: "In America, you're free to be eccentric or even unpatriotic, but not in Russia. Also, I resented the lack of Russian editions of much important Western literature."

A female teacher: "I didn't like their monolithic control of all media and the one-sided education the children get."

A female student: "Pictures of Lenin were absolutely everywhere. He was made into some sort of god."

A businessman: "The strong police control over their people is distasteful to me."

A farmer: "I find depressing the travel restrictions the Soviet government places on its own people .... Also, the government completely controls the press."

A professor: "I was disquieted with the utter disrespect shown Soviet history and culture before 1917."

A male student: "Top officials do not understand our desire to talk to individuals."

A housewife: "I dislike their keeping their citizens ignorant of what is going on outside the USSR."

A male student: "The essential difference between America and the Soviet Union is the intolerance of dissent over there. I can get on any street corner in America and criticize the President. A Soviet citizen publicly criticizing his leadership would be in jail or a mental institution within minutes."

A secretary: "I found the Soviet propaganda in the form of huge monuments, signs, etc., oppressive."

A male teacher: "It's a shivery feeling, for a month being in a country where I can't find out what's going on in the world. I can read Russian, but articles in Soviet papers are not only deadly dull (There are numerous articles about hydro-electric projects in Siberia.) but they are also terribly slanted. The Moscow Daily News (an English language paper) is even worse than the Russian language papers. Next to Pravda, even the Chicago Tribune looks good."

Economic Factors/Standard of Living/Inefficiency

A woman medical worker: "I was disturbed by the generally shoddy quality of consumer goods and of building construction. I wonder whether workers are really happy in their work or whether they just turn out something 'to get it done.' For example, our hotel in Odessa had been opened only one month, and it was already a slum! The walls had mildewed and the paint on the walls had cracked. The toilet did not work. Our bathtub had great globs of cement hardened into it so that it was impossible to bathe. Further, there was no stopper in the sink in any hotel we stayed in in the country. The Soviet Union has accomplished brilliant achievements in space, but they don't know how to put a stopper in the sink."

A doctor: "Pity the consumer in Russia. My wife bought a pair of shoes in Moscow for $20, and in two weeks the soles had come apart. The merchandise seemed quite standardized and shoddy, and the sales personnel were totally uninterested in being of help."

A businessman: "I think we over-rate Soviet efficiency: Idle cranes, elevators that don't work, Intourist schedules always snarled up. The Soviet Union has all the inefficiency of Mexico, with none of its charm."

A male teacher: "... the atrocious washrooms."

A clergyman: "It took me an hour to mail a package in the post office, and this is just typical of the inefficency of the system."

A male teacher: "Soviet citizens generally look poor, although I saw no pockets of poverty which compare with the worst American slums."

A female student: "Trying to make a simple local telephone call in Moscow is a major adventure."

A businessman: "It is difficult to believe that they are as far behind us as they are. However, I can understand it, with a system that offers economic delusions rather than incentive."

A farmer: "Their farming methods seemed backward and inefficient."

A housewife: ".... slowness of service, lack of elevator service, the plumbing troubles."

Other Unfavorable Comments

A funeral director: "It seems the favorite word of Intourist is 'impossible' If you want to change even a small part of your travel plans, it's like a major world crisis for Intourist. With just a little initiative, they could adjust."

An engineer: "It was impossible to get an explanation for anything from Intourist."

A housewife: "... the nightmarish monotony of the apartment buildings."

A housewife: "Soviet culture is over-rated. The ballet at the Kremlin Palace was wobbly; pictures at the Pushkin Museum are high so they can't be seen, and the state doesn't allow artists to try anything new or creative."

A vetinarian: "There are too many drunks on the streets."

A housewife: ".... to see old women working with shovels in ditches."

A farmer: "I was surprised to find prejudice against Africans and Middle Easterners. Not only America is cursed with prejudice."

A lawyer: "Everything seemed too drab and standardized."

A businessman: "The most distasteful part of the Soviet Union to me is their attitude towards religion."

A male student: "They sure take monetary advantage of the tourists."

A white collar worker: ".... the rudeness and shoving of people in stores."

A businessman: "Most of the officials do things 'by the book.'

The slightest deviation creates instant panic."

A housewife: "... the dreary look on people's faces."

* * * *

The above selection of positive and negative comments is typical of the more than 3,000 comments we have record of --- although some of the ones we reprinted tended to be more articulate than the average. The selection of comments is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.

We now turn to our sample's perceptions of foreign policy matters.

Chapter IV

THE SAMPLE'S OPINIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chapter IV

THE SAMPLE'S OPINIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

"There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

--- Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835

"In no country is public opinion so powerful as in the United States."

--- James Bryce in 1900

When a person travels abroad, does he not only experience attitude change about the foreign setting visited, but does he also return home with altered opinions about some policies of his own country? We hypothesized that, indeed, Americans returned home with somewhat different views on aspects of American foreign policy, and we included some questions to test this hypothesis.

We make no claim to having originated the notion that foreign travel can affect attitudes towards one's own country as much as --- or more than --- it affects attitudes towards the nation(s) being visited. Among other studies, Lotte Bailyn and Herbert Kelman found this to be true among Scandinavian students studying in the United States, as did John and Ruth Useem about Indian students studying in Britain and the United States. (Bailyn, Lotte and Kelman, Herbert, "The Effects of a Year's Experience in America on the Self-Image of Scandinavians," Journal of Social Issues, 1962, Vol. 18, pp. 30-40. Useem, John and Ruth, The Western Educated Man in India, New York, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1955.)

Perhaps the best-known study of attitude change towards a particular policy of one's own country, as a result of foreign travel, is American Business and Public Policy, by Bauer, Dexter, and Pool. The authors compared attitudes towards foreign trade policies of businessmen who had traveled considerably abroad and of those who hadn't. The policies advocated by those who had not traveled were largely determined by the particular business interests of their companies. The foreign trade policies advocated by businessmen who had traveled considerably, however, were closer to the lower-tariff policy advocated by the national government. In brief, the effect of foreign travel was to counter the force of self-interest. Bauer, Dexter and Pool found that the businessmen who traveled considerably were periodically placed in the role of playing secretary of state. They became more aware of international political problems and America's position regarding those problems. Their role identification as a representative of Company X became somewhat less important and their role identification as an American citizen became somewhat more important. They began to see trade issues more in national terms and less in the terms of their particular industry. (Raymond Bauer, Lewis Dexter, and Ithiel Pool, American Business and Public Policy, Atherton Press, New York, 1964.)

It was with the Bauer, Dexter, and Pool study in mind that we asked our sample a question on American Vietnam policy using categories which the Gallup organization had devised. We had hypothesized that if there were any shift at all, it would be in the direction of support for American Vietnam policy. We asked the respondents the question, "What would you like to see the United States do next in Vietnam"? Here are the results:

TABLE IV-1

What the United States Should do Next in Vietnam

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. Withdraw completely from Vietnam	5	2	27	12
2. Start negotiations, stop fighting	26	27	133	138
3. Continue present policy (continuing military action, but remaining ready for negotiations)	50	54	260	278
4. Step up military action	17	14	88	74
5. Go all out, declare war	2	3	12	18

As the table shows, the shifts were not large-scale, but such shifts as there were were in the expected direction. The shifts which most immediately hit the eye is the drop from 5% to 2% of the extreme dove position --- "withdraw completely from Vietnam"---- and the increase from 50% to 54% in support of the official US position.

Before we had processed the data, a plausible case had been made to us that there would be a significant increase in dovish responses. The line of argument was this: American tourists in the Soviet Union like Russians and return to the United States with a desire for better understanding between the two nations. The Russian people, however friendly towards Americans, constantly stress their conviction that America should pull out of Vietnam and that this act would markedly improve Soviet-American relations. Many Americans, being constantly confronted with this theme in conversations with Russians, will tend to agree and move towards a more dovish posture on the Vietnam question.

What this line of argument overlooks is the tendency which Bauer, Dexter, and Pool noted of Americans to "play secretary of state" while abroad. The motivation to play secretary of state is all the stronger when a national of a country is in a conflict situation, which is not infrequently the case when an American is traveling in the Soviet Union. In short, the American's primary role identification becomes that of his nationality. As Stewart Perry has written, "It is probably true that in no other role except that of a national is the person expected, in conflict situations, to give up almost any other role he may have, together with any associated values." (Stewart Perry, "Notes on the Role of the National: A Social-Psychological Concept for the Study of International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, 1957, pp. 346-63.)

During a five-week trip we made through the Soviet Union in 1968, we spoke with a number of Americans who did not agree with the government's Vietnam policy and did not hesitate to say so in conversations with Soviet citizens. We spoke with others, however, whose attitude was summed up by this male graduate student:

"I wasn't all that enthusiastic for our Vietnam policy when I came over here, but these people here are so totally misinformed about the real situation in Vietnam that I find every time I get into an argument that I come closer to becoming a real believing advocate of our Vietnam policy."

In short, for some people in our sample, their nationality became a significant part of their personal identity, and the influence of travel in Russia was not to bring them closer to foreign ideas, but to bring them closer to the foreign policy of their own country.

A question asking about support or opposition to American foreign policy in general evoked results somewhat similar to the question on Vietnam. We asked respondents, "How do you feel about American foreign policy in general?' Here are the results:

TABLE IV-2

Feelings About United States Foreign Policy

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. Strongly support it	8	9	45	50
2. Generally support it	50	54	270	292
3. Support it and oppose it in about equal measure	32	28	174	149
4. Generally oppose it	6	7	34	37
5. Strongly oppose it	3	2	15	10

If we collapse categories one and two we see that there is a 5% increase in support of American foreign policy. Although US foreign policy, of course, encompasses much more than policy towards Vietnam, one can make an educated guess than when an American citizen is asked in the late 1960's if he supports or opposes American foreign policy in general, that his position on Vietnam is likely to play a determining role in his response. It is therefore not surprising that the increase in support of an American foreign policy in general roughly parallels the increase in support of US Vietnam policy.

We asked the following Survey Research Center question in order to get a feeling for the degree of internationalism and/or isolationism among the respondents and in order to compare our sample with a national cross-sample: "Following is a statement that some people would agree with and others would disagree with. What would be your position? 'This country would be better off if our government just stayed home and did not concern itself with problems in other parts of the world.'"

What was interesting about the response was not the attitude change, for there was virtually none, but how much more international-minded our sample was than the SRC national cross-sample. Only 5% of our respondents agreed with the statement that the US government should not concern itself with problems in other parts of the world, compared to 28% of the SRC sample. Seventy-nine per cent of the travelers to Russia disagreed with the statement, compared to 65% of the national sample. Everyone else was undecided. The contrast is heightened by the fact that the SRC study was made in 1956, well before the onset of a budding neo-isolationist sentiment induced by the Vietnam war. What we lack data on, of course, is the extent to which Americans who travel abroad are less isolationist than a national random sample. Further, it would be instructive to know how a cross-section of Americans traveling abroad compare with a cross-section of Americans touring the Soviet Union, with regard to internationalism/isolationism. Because of their demographic makeup, we suspect that our sample would tend to be more internationalist than a random sample of Americans traveling abroad, but we have no data to prove it.

Views on Voice of America Broadcasts

A great deal has been written in recent years about the propaganda war, about "the battle for men's minds." The major thrust of America's propaganda campaign in the Soviet Union is provided by the Voice of America, which broadcasts 119 hours a week to the USSR in Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian. As suggested in a previous chapter, a trip to the Soviet Union is for many persons a highly-politicized experience, and we had hypothesized that many of our respondents would return with a more affirmative interest in America's propaganda efforts. This, in fact, proved to be the case, as a glance at Table IV-3 will show. The travelers were asked: "Some people believe that we should expand our Voice of America broadcasts in order to offset Soviet propaganda. What do you feel?"

TABLE IV-3

Should Voice of America Broadcasts be Expanded or Decreased?

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. We should expand greatly our broadcasts	31	44	155	225
2. We should expand somewhat our broadcasts	28	26	144	129
3. We should maintain about the same level	34	24	172	121
4. We should decrease somewhat our broadcasts	3	3	16	17
5. We should decrease greatly our broadcasts	4	3	20	15

BEFORE MEAN 2.214
AFTER MEAN 1.950

We observe in the above table a 13% increase in the number of people who believe that Voice of America broadcasts should be expanded "greatly". Further, if we collapse categories one and two and categories four and five, we find in the post-travel data a total of 70% opting for expanded VOA broadcasts and a total of only 6% for decreased broadcasts. The 13% increase in the number advocating "greatly" expanded VOA broadcasts is probably less a reflection of the fact that tourists sampled the product and found it good (Relatively few tourists have heard VOA broadcasts -- or understand them.) than it is a reflection of the frustrations involved in political arguments with Soviet citizens. A dentist we interviewed in Moscow in July of 1968 probably summed up the feelings of many others when he said:

"I like these people, but arguing politics with them is something like trying to punch wool. Not only do we begin with different sets of premises, but we also argue from different sets of facts. It's frustrating as hell. I've gotten into lots of political discussions over here, but I don't think I've affected anyone's opinion on anything. I'll just have to trust the Voice of America to carry on where I leave off."

A young woman teacher who speaks Russian wrote this about Voice of America:

"I found that many Russian young people listen to the Voice of America quite regularly, not only to hear American music and to practice English (author's note: the USSR receives English), but also to hear another side of the news which they realize that their papers and radio don't present. I think VOA has a tremendous impact on many Russians and that the broadcasting schedule should be expanded."

It may be recalled that Table III-18 showed that 85% of the respondents thought after travel that Russians were inaccurately informed about the United States. In sum, tourism to the Soviet Union is for many persons "political tourism", and many come back with a heightened awareness of the propaganda war between the two countries and with stronger feelings that America should expand its propaganda efforts.

Resolution of Differences with the USSR

Does a trip to the USSR affect Americans' opinions about the possibility of resolution of differences between the two countries? Our data was somewhat ambiguous on this question: "Do you think it is possible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviet Union?"

TABLE IV-4

Possible to Reach Peaceful Settlement of Differences with Russia?

	%		No.	
	Before	After	Before	After
1. Definitely	18	21	99	116
2. Probably	62	55	333	296
3. Probably not	16	21	88	108
4. Definitely not	3	3	16	16

We see in the table that there is a slight increase in the number answering both "definitely" and "probably not" and a decrease in the number checking "probably". There is very little conclusive about the data in Table IV-4. What is perhaps more instructive is to compare the responses of our sample and a nation-wide sampling made by Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion in June, 1965. Gallup found that 58% of his sample thought a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviet Union was "possible"; 24% thought it was "impossible"; and 18% had no opinion. Gallup's response options are not exactly parallel to ours, but they are close enough to make some kind of comparison. If we collapse categories one and two, we find that 76% of our sample in the after-travel questionnaire think that peaceful settlement of differences is possible, 18% more than Gallup's national sample. If we translate "definitely not" in our questionnaire into "impossible" then only 3% of our respondents --- both before and after travel --- think a peaceful settlement of differences is "impossible". However, there is no corresponding category in Gallup's research to our "probably not", and if the 21% who chose that option in our survey were forced into Gallup's narrower categories, they would probably divide in some fashion between "possible" and "impossible".

The strange, multifaceted triangular relationship of the Soviet Union, Red China, and the United States has an important bearing on the question of the United States and the USSR reaching a peaceful accommodation of differences. In retrospect, we regret not including a question on this subject. A Lou Harris Poll taken in May, 1969 is perhaps of more than parenthetical interest. Harris found that on the issue of the growing split between the Soviet Union and Red China, the American people were either neutral (44%) or on the side of the Soviets (36%). Only 3% took the Chinese side in the event of a confrontation between the two Communist superpowers.

Open-ended Responses

When respondents finished completing the after-travel questionnaire, they read the following paragraph:

"Questionnaires of this type often limit a person in expressing the thoughts uppermost in his mind. Thus, it would be invaluable for this research if, on a separate sheet of paper, you could write some general comments about how your trip to the USSR may have influenced your thinking about the Soviet Union and/or about political questions in general. For example, you might have some specific foreign policy recommendations for the U.S. government."

Although the post-travel questionnaire took fifteen to twenty-five minutes to complete, forty-seven persons took the time to write additional comments. On the average, these persons wrote four to six supplementary paragraphs, but the additional comments ranged from one paragraph to eight single-spaced typewritten pages.

Of the forty-seven respondents who wrote additional comments, forty-one accepted the invitation to make foreign policy suggestions. Of the forty-one, thirty-three wrote on aspects of the theme of exchange of persons. This is rather striking, for no effort was made to channel their open-ended responses on foreign policy matters in any particular direction. Further, exchange of persons was not mentioned once in the questionnaire --- an omission which the respondents corrected. Here is a sampling of comments on the broad theme of exchange of persons:

A male teacher: ".... Exchanges, of course, will not solve all the problems of the cold war, but they will help to counteract the plethora of misconceptions held by both peoples. Contrary to what many Americans think, most Americans appear to be loyal to their regime. Contrary to what many Russians believe, all Americans do not hate the negro, nor do Americans wish war. It seems to me that in exchanges of this kind the appeal of the free society must be advanced."

A secretary: "I suggest that more emphasis be placed on the importance of good manners and good behavior (The underlining is hers.) for those going to Russia. Our allies can put up with our arrogance and drunken stupidity, but the Russians are very sensitive.. If there are many going to Russia, similar to some I met, soon the Russians will like neither our government nor our people!"

A retired farmer: "I am sure the people-to-people movement creates some goodwill between us, because a friendly handshake and a friendly smile are not as easily misunderstood as words. I hate to say this but the better-educated people, whether Russian or American, were more unfriendly and created the least goodwill. I am sure that if millions of common people throughout the world could meet as my wife and I met with Russians there would be a little less chance of another war, because we feel that we have made some friends in Russia."

A clergyman: "I believe the ultimate peace of the world depends upon our developing better relations with Russia. We need to press for greater cultural exchange, and we need to step up trade with Communist countries."

A male student: "As a result of a language exchange program I now have dear personal friends in Russia, and the thought of war with that country is horrible to me."

A male student: "Because of the frankness and sincerity of the majority of students, I believe the U.S: should devote more attention to transfer programs between high school and college students of the two countries. If we could build the infectious friendship of youth now, perhaps in the future many of the problems could be solved between the USSR and America.

A woman student: "One of the main causes of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union is lack of real understanding. This doesn't mean that we have to read Marx and they, Jefferson. It means that we both have to consider the other as people, not as animated products of their ideology. Each side needs to know that the other side is mostly made up of everyday people living day-to-day lives, and more concerned with domestic problems than with dominating other countries. So I think we need as much mutual contact as possible between us --- more cultural exchanges, student exchanges, pen-pals, etc."

The exchange theme was the dominant one in the open-ended responses. No other theme was mentioned more than three times. The statement by the retired farmer on the preceding page is very similar to ones the author has heard dozens of times while speaking with American tourists in the Soviet Union. The theme is a simple one: If only more of the ordinary people of the Soviet Union and the United States could meet each other and see that we both want peace and have much in common, then the chances for peace in the world would be greatly enhanced.

Many policy makers and social scientists may regard this as an overly simplistic notion, but there is no denying that it is a deeply-held article of faith on the part of great numbers of Americans who have traveled in Russia.

Chapter V

The Relation of Education, Level of Information, and Related Factors To Attitude Change

Chapter V

The Relation of Education, Level of Information, and Related Factors to Attitude Change

"Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to the uneducated: 'As much,' said he, 'as the living are to the dead.'"
---Diogenes Laertius (Aristotle, V.i.)

"A learned blockhead is a greater blockhead than an ignorant one."
----Benjamin Franklin

"There is nothing so stupid as an educated man, if you get off the thing he was educated in."
---Will Rogers

Up to this point, we have presented data on perceptions of our sample as a whole. From this point on, we will be examining perceptions of subgroups within the sample. We will be examining what differences --- if any --- factors such as education, age, occupation, fluency in the Russian language, aspects of the travel experience, and other variables make in the ways American travelers perceive the Soviet Union.

Social scientists have found that one's level of education does make a difference in the way that people perceive various phenomena. A person with, say, an eighth-grade education usually does see the world through a somewhat different set of lenses from the person who has a post-graduate degree.

In research somewhat related to ours on "National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts", Erich Reitgrotski and Nels Anderson reported some results of research on stereotypes of Frenchmen and Germans in relation to the extent of contact that respondents had with them. They found that neither age nor sex accounted for variance in response, but that education did:

"Persons of higher education tend to be more tolerant of other peoples as well as more critical in their ratings. By more critical, we mean that they are more likely to modify a negative rating with a positive one or a positive with a negative." (Erich Reitgrotski and Nels Anderson, "National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts,"Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 23, p. 520.)

William A. Scott, writing about "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," said:

"Results from a number of studies support a preliminary generalization that help benign images of the world and a desire for cooperative involvement in it will more frequently be found among the well-informed segments of the population than among the poorly-informed. In the United States, it has often been shown that people who are well-informed about world affairs are more likely than the ignorant to espouse internationalist foreign politics in general and to support the United Nations in particular as a mechanism of cooperative involvement." (William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," International Behavior, op. cit.)

Scott writes about "level of information," and we shall be examining that subject later in this chapter. Although level of education and level of information are not synonymous, there is, of course, a relationship.

Before examining the relationship between education and perceptions of the Soviet Union, a word is order on the form in which we will present the data on this variable and the other independent variables to follow. For each independent variable we will present tables on "Favorable-Unfavorable Perceptions," "Strength-Weakness Perceptions," and "Average Change Regardless of Direction." As we see in Table V-I(A), the tables on positive-negative affect are broken down into "Government," "People," and "Society" (aspects of Soviet society). The tables give in graph form the composite before-travel and after-travel means for the eight affective adjectives for "government" found in the semantic differential, the same eight adjectives for "people," and the ten "aspects of Soviet society." The "total" column gives the average of the twenty-six before-travel means and the average of the twenty-six after-travel means. This type of arrangement allows the reader to visualize the difference (if any) between the pre-travel and post-travel means and also the extent to which respondents dichotomize between the people, on the one hand, and the government and the system, on the other. The positive pole is +3, and the negative pole is -3, with 0 being the midpoint.

The figures for strength-weakness perceptions are taken from the average of the means for the eight strength-weakness adjective pairs for government and people. (Table V-2(B).

We were interested not only in direction of attitude change, but also in how much attitude change, regardless of direction. In other words, we wanted to see what kinds of persons were most susceptible to attitude change. Thus, the third in the series of charts for each independent variable will be "Average Change Regardless of Direction." The average change was computed from the total of thirty-four items on the favorable-unfavorable continuums and strength-weakness continuums which were just referred to.

We also have data on how various education, age, occupation, etc., subgroups responded to the various specific questions. To present all that data on all the subgroups for all the independent variables would mean that the reader (as well as the writer) would be come bogged down in immense quagmire of figures. In order to keep the data manageable, we will make reference only to some of the more noticeable features of this particular part of the data terrain.

Level of Education and Attitude Change

As we pointed out in Chapter II, one of the most striking things about our sample is its overall high educational attainment. Only 13% had not gone past high school, and 42% had either done post-graduate work or had gone to a professional school. What difference, if any, does the level of education make in perceptions of the Soviet Union? We find the answer on the following three pages of charts.

The most significant thing about Table V-1(A), it seems to us, is not the *difference* of favorable-unfavorable perceptions of persons of different educational levels, but rather the *similarity* of outlook. We observe in the graph that those who had a high school education or less, those who had four years of college and that those who attended post-graduate or professional school all went to the USSR with positive images of the people and came back somewhat more positive; and that all the groupings had rather negative images of the government and Soviet society and came back slightly more negative or remained the same.

We find the same general pattern when we look at Table V-1(B), dealing with strength-weakness perceptions. All three groups see the government as strong after travel, but less strong than before travel. Further, their before-travel and after-travel means on "government" are remarkably close, as is the case with their perceptions of the Soviet people. The three sub-groups rate "people" just below the midpoint of the strength-weakness continuum before travel and somewhat lower after travel.

TABLE V-1(A)

EDUCATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE - UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS (71)



FOUR OR LESS YEARS OF COLLEGE (241)



POST GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL (228)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

B. STRENGTH-WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

TABLE V-1(B)

HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS (71)



FOUR OR LESS YEARS OF College (241)



POST GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL (228)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE V-1(C) C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION



① HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS (71)
② FOUR OR LESS YEARS OF College (241)
③ POST GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL (228)

We had hypothesized that those with less education would experience greater attitude change than those with more education. We see in Table V-1 (C), "Average Change Regardless of Direction," that this, in fact, proved to be the case. Those with a high school education or less experienced almost half-again as much change as the post-graduates.

We can only assume that those with college education are, in general, more well-read and better informed on conditions in the USSR than those with a high school education or less. The college-educated are thus less surprised by what they find and therefore experience less attitude change. We offer this, at least, as a plausible hypothesis.

We compared the before-travel and after-travel means of the high school-or-less group and the post-graduate group (hereafter, for shorthand purposes, referred to as high schoolers and post-grads) for the whole spectrum of questions covered in chapters three and four. Here are some of the more interesting findings:

On the question relating to internationalism/isolationism, we found that the post-grads were significantly more internationalist before travel than the high schoolers. The travel experience apparently had an impact on the high schoolers. Whereas the post-grads moved slightly more towards the internationalist pole, the high schoolers closed much of the gap between themselves and the post-grads.

The post-grads found the government somewhat less friendly and less peace-loving than the high schoolers. Both groups had a favorable overall impression of Soviet education, although both experienced some negative attitude change. The post-grads had a somewhat higher evaluation of Soviet education than the high schoolers in the after-travel questionnaire, even though they experienced slightly more negative attitude change.

The post-grads were slightly more supportive of increased Voice of America broadcasts and of US foreign policy in general than the high schoolers, although both groups were generally supportive.

The high schoolers rated Soviet culture as "neither favorable nor unfavorable," whereas the post-grads put culture in the "somewhat favorable" category.

Both groups were notably unimpressed by the consumer goods situation, although the high schoolers experienced twice as great a negative attitude change.

In the area of social welfare, the post-grads underwent a slight negative change and the high schoolers, a slight positive change. Yet, in the post-travel questionnaire, the post-grads rated social welfare as "somewhat favorable" whereas the high schoolers put it into the "neither favorable nor unfavorable" category.

These differences notwithstanding, we repeat the observation made earlier that the similarities of attitude change of the various educational groupings were more notable than the differences. On the great majority of questions the respondents moved in the same direction, no matter what the level of educational attainment. However, as pointed out earlier, the intensity of attitude change was greater among those with less education --- probably a reflection of the fact that they were less well-informed on what to anticipate.

Following Political Affairs and Attitude Change

In Chapter II we observed that a relatively high per cent of our sample --- 59% --- said that they followed political affairs "regularly," compared to 27% for a national cross-sample (page 28). Thirty-eight per cent of our sample responded "from time to time", and only three per cent said, "very seldom".

Although we have no data on our sample on the relationship between level of education and following public affairs, we assumed that there was a relationship. Based on other studies and on the data on education and intensity of attitude change, we hypothesized that those who follow public affairs regularly experience less attitude change than those who were less constant in keeping up with public affairs.

Bernard Berelson, surveying a number of election studies, wrote:

"In most campaigns, whether political or informational, the people best informed on the issue are the ones least likely to change their minds. Much of this represents attitudinal stability; some of it may represent rigidity." (Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XVI (Fall, 1952) p. 318.)

. Our data shows that there were comparatively few significant differences in the direction of attitude change among the three subgroups. A glance at Table V-2(C) shows that those who say they follow political affairs "regularly" are the most stable in their attitudes and that those who follow public affairs "very seldom" experience about two-and-a-half times as much attitude change as the first group. Those who follow political affairs "from time to time" show more stability than the "very seldom" group but show more attitude change than the first group.

Clearcut evidence of the relationship between following public affairs and attitude change is presented in Table V-3 below. The table shows the number of times that each subgroup averaged more than .2, .3, and .4 attitude change on a total of forty-nine questions.

TABLE V-2 (A)

FOLLOWING POLITICAL AFFAIRS RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE - UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS REGULARLY (324)



FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS FROM TIME TO TIME (207)



FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS VERY SELDOM (16)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

TABLE V-2(B)

FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS REGULARLY (344)



FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS FROM TIME TO TIME (207)



FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS VERY SELDOM (16)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION

TABLE V-2(C)



① FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS REGULARLY (344)
② FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS FROM TIME TO TIME (207)
③ FOLLOW POLITICAL AFFAIRS VERY SELDOM (16)

TABLE V-3

Following Political Affairs and Attitude Change

Follow Political Affairs	No. of persons	Number of times changed more than:		
		.2	.3	.4
1. Regularly	324	10	6	2
2. Time to time	205	17	10	7
3. Very seldom	16	32	27	19

It would have been desirable, of course, to have more than sixteen persons in the "very seldom" group, but even with a significantly higher "N" we suspect that we wuuld have found the same basic pattern.

In summary, then, there seems to be a definite relationship between following political affairs and intensity of attitude change. Those who follow political affairs regularly experience less attitude change than those who don't.

Expectations of Communicating about the Trip

We mentioned in Chapter II that in response to the question, "Do you expect to speak to any organization or group about your visit to the Soviet Union and/or write articles about the trip?," the rather extraordinary total of 75% answered in the affirmative. We have no way of knowing, of course, how many of those who said that they were going to communicate about the trip fulfilled their intentions --- or, for that matter, how many of the 25% who said they were not going to communicate ended up doing so. Nor do we have any data on whether any given communication took the form of a nationally-viewed television interview or a speech before an English class on "How I Spent My Summer Vacation."

Even if one-half, or one-third, of those who said they were going to communicate about their travel experience did, in fact, do so, we would still find this a striking figure. The fact that such a high percentage of our respondents are "communicators" may, in part, be explained by their generally high level of educational attainment; but that, in itself, is not a sufficient explanation. One cannot imagine that if the same sample were going to, say, the Bahamas or Switzerland that three-quarters would expect to communicate about their trip in the public prints or in a public forum.

Why, then, do so many expect to communicate? Our answer is based on speculation, rather than on hard data: Although Russia may no longer, in Churchill's phrase, be "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," it is still for many people as mysterious an entity now as it was under the Czars. Further, as one writer expressed it, it is perceived as being "the enemy thing." One need not have a self-image of being a James Bond in order to experience a certain amount of excitement in seeing, hearing, touching, smelling that which is America's most powerful antagonist.

Add to the ingredients of "mystery" and "the enemy thing" the fact that relatively few Americans visit the Soviet Union annually (compared to the avalanche of U.S. tourists who descend on Western Europe) and the fact that there are many curious audiences anxious to hear about Russia, and one finds a ready-made situation for communication. The veterinarian from the small Midwestern town may be the only person in his town to have ever been to the Soviet Union, and he may be on the Rotary Club, Methodist Church group, etc. circuit for weeks telling what it was "really like."

In short, most Americans visiting the Soviet Union find it a fascinating travel experience and have a desire to communicate about it. (Parenthetically, it may well be that David Reisman's "inside dopester" thesis is applicable to many Americans returning from the Soviet Union.)

As we indicated above, we only have data on the per cent expecting to communicate. It would have been interesting to have data on the per cent which actually did communicate and also on the communication situations themselves, but then this is a subject worthy of a whole study by itself. Scholars in the field of communications have generally held that attitudes of the type developed during travel tend to be somewhat diffuse until the actual moment when the person is forced to communicate his idea either on paper (in a questionnaire or an article, for example) or verbally. They have further held that the specific attitude developed is often determined in part by the audience to be addressed. That is, the speaker may often tend to tailor his remarks for the particular audience. It obviously makes a difference whether the audience is the Junior Chamber of Commerce or a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, or simply a colleague in the medical profession. Having tailored his speech to a particular audience, and wanting to remain psychologically consistent, he may well internalize his own remarks. Thus, it is altogether likely that some of our respondents adjusted some of their views after having completed our post-travel questionnaire in order to conform to certain expectations of a given audience or to conform to certain role expectations in discussions with others.

We originally included the communicating-with-others query in our questionnaire in order to get a very rough feeling as to whether tourists who have been to Russia play any role in forming the image that Americans generally hold of the Soviet Union. One thing seems sure: if the tourists do not play such a role, it is certainly not for a lack of wanting to communicate.

Having included the question, we decided to go one step further and treat desire to communicate as an independent variable. That is, was there a notable difference in the way that communicators and non-communicators (to employ a shorthand term) perceived the Soviet Union? We had hypothesized that there would be. Overall, our hypothesis was wrong.

As the following three pages of tables show, the communicators and non-communicators, for the most part, tended to perceive the Soviet Union similarly. With one exception, the two groups moved in the same direction, and Table V-4(C) shows that they experienced approximately the same degree of attitude change. The one exception was on positive-negative affect towards the Russian people. Table V-4(A) shows that the communicators and non-communicators were roughly equal in their positive feelings about the Russian people before travel. The communicators experienced a small positive change, and the non-communicators moved slightly in the opposite direction. Since the changes are relatively small, it would be dangerous to attempt to draw any conclusions. The only other minor difference is that the non-communicators see both the government and people as slightly stronger than the communicators (although both groups move in the same direction).

On the whole, however, a glance at the following three pages of charts, plus an examination of the before-travel and after-travel means on the various specific questions show that the communicators and the non-communicators tend to see the Soviet Union through similar sets of lenses.

We turn now to the relationship between knowledge of the Russian language and attitude change.

TABLE V-4(A)

EXPECTATIONS OF COMMUNICATING TRAVEL EXPERIENCE RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

Do you expect to speak to any organization or group about your visit to the Soviet Union and/or write articles about the trip?

A. FAVORABLE - UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (413)



DOES NOT EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (131)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

TABLE V-4(B)

EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (413)



DOES NOT EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (131)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION

TABLE V-4(C)



① EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (413)
② DOES NOT EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT TRIP (131)

CHAPTER VI

Russian-Language Ability and Attitude Change

Chapter VI

Russian-Language Ability and Attitude Change

"Translation from one language to another is like viewing a piece of tapestry on the wrong side where, though the figures are distinguishable, yet there are so many ends and threads that the beauty and exactness of the work is obscured."

---Cervantes

"Today the cost of failure to communicate is not silence or serenity but destruction and disullusion."

---Lyndon B. Johnson

"Every language is a temple, in which the soil of those who speak it is enshrined."

---Oliver Wendell Holmes

"Language is not an abstract construction of the learned, or of dictionary-makers, but is something arising out of the work, needs, ties, joys, affections, tastes, of long generations of humanity, and has its bases broad and low, close to the ground."

---Walt Whitman

George Bernard Shaw once wrote that "America and Britain are two great countries separated by the same language." Shaw, with his characteristic rapier thrust, was pointing to a real truth: that real communication is difficult enough, even when the parties speak the same language. It is all the more difficult when the languages are different.

Russian is an incredibly rich and complex language and, as any Russian language student will testify, not easy to master. Compared to most Western European languages, it has relatively few cognates for the English-speaking person to latch on to.

For the American engaging in political discussions, the difficulty of speaking in a complex foreign language is increased by the fact that a kind of Communist jargon has developed that attaches quite different meanings to words that we use frequently. For example, the late Hadley Cantril found in Soviet dictionaries and encyclopedias the following official meanings for words: (For contrast, the English-language meanings, as found in standard American dictionaries, are given side-by-side with the Soviet definitions.)

Word	Soviet Meaning	American Meaning
Individualism	"The individual-as-a-member-of-a-collective"	"The pursuit of individual rather than common or collective interests"
Freedom	"The recognition of necessity"	"Exemption from necessity, in choice and action; as, the freedom of the will"
Charity	"Help granted hyprocritcally by representatives of the dominant class in societies of exploiters to a certain fraction of the disinherited sectors of the population in order to deceive the workers and to divert their attention from the class struggle"	"An act of feeling of affection or benevolence"
Initiative	"Independent search for the best way to fulfil a command"	"Self-reliant enterprise; self-initiated activity"

(The above is quoted from David Krech, Richard Crutchfield, and Egerton Ballachey, Individual in Society, McGraw-Hill, 1962, p. 286.)

Knowing the language is more important for an American traveler in the Soviet Union than it is in the great majority of Western European countries where many fluent English-speakers can be found. Although more than half of the Soviet students now study English for at least five years, Americans we have interviewed generally found that --- however good Russians may be at reading and writing English --- their verbal skills are less than impressive. The Russians plainly lack practice. Many Americans who have struck up conversations with Soviets report that the Russians say, "You are the first American (or "English-speaking person") I have met."

Many who do talk with Russians have to rely upon their Intourist guides as interpreters. This procedure, of course, does not enhance relaxed, informal conversation.

There are, of course, various levels of communication. As anyone knows who has traveled to the Soviet Union, or, indeed, to any other non-English-speaking country, it is not necessary to know the language in order to communicate at some elemental level. We have observed outgoing, gregarious Americans who didn't know more than ten words of Russian"talk" up to a half-hour with Russians who knew no more than a snippet of English. They communicated by means of gestures, smiles, grimaces, and some occasional words which penetrated the language barrier. A foreign visitor to the United States who knew little English said to his American host: "Your heart speaks a language that my heart understands. Let it speak." We suspect that there has been a considerable amount of "communication of the heart" among Russians and American travelers. Although the will to communicate is no substitute for language fluency, it can provide for communication at the level of "feeling", as well as the exchange of some elemental facts.

We had hypothesized that language would be an important factor in attitude change, because language facilitates communication and makes easier informal contact. Further, a person who has studied Russian may have a greater affinity for the culture and may have more realistic expectations about the country (based on more reading about the USSR than the average person). Before assessing whether the hypothesis was correct or not, a word is in order about the Russian-language ability of our sample.

We were fortunate in obtaining a relatively large sample of respondents who spoke Russian. As Table V1-1 shows, 24% said that they spoke Russian either fluently or moderately well. We are sure that the Russian-language fluency of a random sample of Americans visiting the USSR would be substantially lower. We attribute the high percentage of Russian-language speakers in our sample to special mailings of the questionnaire to persons participating in intensive Russian-language university study programs. These language students studied Russian intensively in the United States during part of the summer and then continued their studies for several weeks in the Soviet Union.

TABLE V1-1

Ability to Speak Russian Language

	%	No.
1. Fluently	4	20
2. Moderately well	20	111
3. Somewhat	7	39
4. Poorly	4	24
5. Not at all	65	353

The above figures reflect not objectively-tested language ability, but rather self-perceptions of language ability, and it may well be that it is more important to know the latter than the former. In their study of foreign students in the United States, Selltiz, Christ, Havel, and Cook found that "the student's confidence in his ability to speak English is a more important influence on the development of social relations than in his actual command of the language as estimated by an American interviewer." (Claire Selltiz, June Christ, Joan Havel, and Stuart Cook, Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States, University of Minnesota Press, 1963, p. 249.)

For the purposes of comparison, we collapsed categories 1 and 2, that is, those who said that they spoke Russian "fluently" and "moderately well," and categories 4 and 5, "poorly" and "not at all." We left out the middle category, "somewhat." We ended up with a total of 131 Russian-speakers and 377 non-Russian-speakers.

A look at Table V1-2(A) reveals that the two groups entered the Soviet Union with approximately similar expectations about the government and society, but that the Russian-speakers felt significantly more positive affect for the Soviet people. The biggest changes were a favorable one towards the people by the non-Russian-speakers and a negative shift towards Soviet society by the Russian-speakers. The Russian-speakers seemed to have their very positive expectations about the Soviet people confirmed.

The most interesting aspect of Table V1-2(A), it seems to us, is that the "people-good, system-bad" dichotomy generally made by our respondents is made even more strongly by the Russian-speakers. One can engage in speculation---and it is no more than that---that the studying of Russian predisposed persons to more fully-appreciate the Russian character; and that the ability to speak the language facilitated communication so that the Russian-speaker was able to "dig beneath the surface" and find flaws in the system not so readily apparent to the non-Russian speaker.

As stated before, the Russian speakers experience negative attitude change about aspects of Soviet society; but they move slightly in a positive direction about the government. Although this may appear contradictory, on the surface, it is not at all unusual for various subgroups to move attitudinally in different direction with respect to government and society. We shall explain in a later chapter.

The Russian-speakers experienced three times as much positive attitude change towards the government on the "peace-loving" item. Possibly, the Russians' frequently-verbalized passion for peace has affected perceptions of the government as well as the people on this issue. That is, there seems to have been a certain transference effect.

On the other hand, with respect to aspects of Soviet society, the Russian-speakers show unambiguous negative changes on "social welfare" and "rate of unemployment", whereas the non-Russian-sepakers move slightly in the positive direction.

Also, Russian-speakers experience four times as much negative attitude change on "education" as the other group. Before travel, the Russian-speakers had a "very favorable" view, and the non-Russian-speakers had a "somewhat favorable" image of Soviet education. After travel, both groups were in the "somewhat favorable" category. It should be pointed out that the great majority of Russian-speakers had a direct experience with Soviet educational institutions, as they received intensive Russian-language instruction in the USSR. They enrolled in special courses for foreigners. However, as the great majority of the tourists in our sample were in the USSR during the summer---a period when Russian schools are closed---they had little opportunity to see the regular education system in operation.

TABLE VI-1(A)

RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS COMPARED TO NON-RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS

A. FAVORABLE-UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS



TABLE VI-1(B)

B. STRENGTH-WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

RUSSIAN SPEAKERS (131)



NON-RUSSIAN SPEAKERS (377)



* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VI-1(C)

AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION



As Table V1-2(B) shows, language ability doesn't seem to be a very important factor in strength-weakness perceptions, although the non-Russian-speakers saw the government as less strong than those who could speak the language.

We see on Table V1-2(C) that there is very little difference between the two groups with respect to attitude change, regardless of direction. The Russian speakers show just slightly more change. Our guess is that there are contradictory forces at work on the Russian-speakers, with respect to intensity of attitude change. On the other hand, language competence facilitates communication, which one would think would lead to a greater learning experience than were possible for the average non-Russian-speaker, On the other hand, it is a fair assumption that the average person who has studied the language has also made a greater investment of time in studying about the country. More often than not, a person who studies the Russian language also takes one or more courses on the Soviet Union and reads more in periodicals about Russia. In short, the Russian-language-speakers are more likely to be well-informed about the USSR, to have more realistic expectations about the country. These two factors---facility of communication and realistic pre-travel expectations---might well balance each other off with respect to intensity of attitude change.

There were some interesting differences in how the Russian-speakers and the non-Russian-speakers responded to individual questions. Both groups moved attitudinally in the direction of expanded Voice of America broadcasts but the Russian-speakers moved half-again as much. This is probably related to the fact that the Russian-speakers undoubtedly had more political discussions than the others.

Both groups saw the government as considerably more disorganized after travel, compared to before travel, and the change of the Russian-speakers on this question was twice as large as the non-Russian-speakers. On the other hand, the unfavorable change of the non-Russian-speakers on "consumer goods" was twice as great as that of the Russian-speakers. The latter group probably had more realistic expectations. The biggest change for the Russian-speakers was on the religious-athiestic semantic differential on the Russian people. They perceived the people as being considerably more athiestic after travel, one-third again as much as the non-Russian-speakers.

One of our concerns with the data presented in this chapter is that we cannot be sure to what extent we have isolated the language variable. That is, a significant majority of the 131 Russian-speakers were students, although there were a number of teachers in the Russian-language study program, as well as some other Russian-speakers who were not in the language-study program at all. We had wanted to run a control by comparing the perceptions of Russian-speaking students with non-Russian-speaking students, but, unfortunately, there was not a sufficient number of non-Russian-speaking students in our sample. Thus, we can't be sure to what extent there has been a blurring of the lines between the language variable and the occupation and age variables.

Perhaps more light will be shed on this matter when we examine the age and occupation factors later.

Chapter VII

Sex and Age Related to Attitude Change

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Sex and Age Related to Attitude Change

"Time and circumstance, which enlarge the views of most men, narrow the views of women almost invariably."
---Thomas Hardy (Jude the Obscure)

"Women are wiser than men, because they know less and understand more."
---James Stephens (The Crock of Gold)

"The older I grow the more I distrust the familar doctrine that age brings wisdom."
---H.L. Mencken (Prejudices)

"My old age judges more charitably and thinks better of mankind than my youth ever did."
---George Santayana (Persons and Places)

In this chapter we will look at two of the demographic variables traditionally examined in survey research---sex and age.

Social scientists have generally agreed that when men and women do hold divergent views on foreign affairs, women tend to be more idealistic and internationalist in their attitudes. This was one of the findings of Gabriel Almond in his survey of attitude research in the field of foreign policy in The American People and Foreign Policy. He also found that more women than men wanted a conciliatory policy with Russia, as opposed to a "get tough" policy. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, Harcourt & Brace, 1960).

David Krech, Richard Crutchfield and Egerton Ballachey wrote:

Many investigators have observed significant sex differences in persuasibility....Females are found to be more persuasible than males." (Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, op. cit., p. 221.)

William Scott, reviewing some of the survey research literature, wrote:

"Sex-role differentiation within Western society has traditionally tended to foster interpersonal aggressiveness in the male and passivity in the female. Such a tendency toward contrast in interpersonal roles appears to be reflected in the sex differences in international attitudes found in Australia, Canada, and Great Britain....Women are less likely to advocate aggressive international relations." (William Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," International Behavior, op. cit., p. 97.)

Having read statements like those quoted above on the difference of some foreign policy views held by males and females, we had anticipated finding a number of notable differences in responses of the two sexes. In point of fact, the responses of the males and females were remarkably similar. The favorable-unfavorable perceptions of males and females charted on Table VII-1(A) are almost identical and the average change, regardless of direction, shown in Table VII-1(C) is identical.

TABLE VII-1(A)

SEX RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE - UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS





TABLE VII-1(B)

SEX RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS



TABLE VII-1(c)

SEX RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION



In Table VII-1(B) we see that the degree of attitude change on strength-weakness perceptions is virtually the same but that women perceive the government as somewhat stronger than men, both before and after travel.

In comparing the before-travel means and after-travel means of the individual questions we paid particular attention to those questions on which previous survey research indicated there might be a divergence of views. On the question, "Do you think it is possible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviet Union?", the mean answer of both sexes was "probably", and the positive attitude change of males and females on this question was barely measurable. Further, on the questions on stepping up our Voice of America broadcasts and on the theme of internationalism/isolationism, the changes of attitude were virtually parallel.

Only on a handful of questions were there visible differences. Women found their reception in the Soviet Union somewhat friendlier than they had expected, whereas men's attitudes remained about the same on this question. However, men had higher pre-travel expectations of friendliness.

Men perceived the Soviet government as being somewhat more peace-loving after travel, but women experienced three times as much positive attitude change on this question. The biggest difference of all between the sexes was on the theme of Soviet cultural achievements. The women showed a very slight positive change, but the men a significant negative change. Whether the women, who are often assumed to be more culturally-oriented than men, spent more time frequenting the cultural monuments of the Soviet Union is a subject on which we have no data.

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, there were 397 men and 149 women in our sample. The disparity is explained by the fact that we asked that, whenever possible, the head of the family fill out the questionnaire. The great majority of our respondents traveled either with their spouses and/or in travel groups in which there were members of the opposite sex. The fact that we found fewer differences than expected in the attitudes of men and women may, in part, be explained by the possibility that conversations with the opposite sex (whether a spouse and/or members of the travel group) was a modifying influence.

Age

How important is the age factor in perceptions of the Soviet Union? Young people tend to be less afflicted with hardened psychic structures and old images and, presumably, should be more open to attitude change.

Almond wrote that there is "substantial homogeneity in the foreign policy attitudes of the various age groups in the United States." (Gabriel Almond, op. cit., p. 117.) He was writing two decades ago, however, and his statement may be less true today. He went on to write:

"The comparatively small deviation in the foreign policy attitudes of the younger age groups, as one might expect, lies in the direction of a greater foreign policy idealism and optimism." (Gabriel Almond, op. cit., p. 117.)

A look at the charts on the following pages is quite interesting, although sometimes a bit confusing. Table VII-2(A) shows us that those under the age of thirty are the least negative about the government, and the most positive about the people, both before and after travel. (It must be remembered, however, that the great majority of Russian-speakers fall in the under-thirty bracket, and so we have a blurring of the lines of the age and language factors.) However, those under twenty-one experience a negative attitude change on aspects of Soviet society, second only to those in the forty-one-to fifty age group.

We admit to being fascinated by the attitude change of the oldest group, those over sixty-one. They entered the Soviet Union with the least positive image of the Soviet people and experienced the greatest positive attitude change of any group. In fact, their positive attitude change was three times as great as the group with the second-most positive attitude change, those between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one. Further, the most elderly group entered the Soviet Union with the most negative attitude towards Soviet society and emerged the least negative. If we skip to Table VII-2(C), we observe that those sixty-one or over showed the greatest intensity of attitude change.

Of all the findings on the various groups covered so far in these chapters, this is the most surprising one. The group which one would expect would show the least attitude change, is, in fact, the group which shows the most attitude change. How can one explain this? We can offer one partial explanation, not with full certitude that it is correct, but at least as a working hypothesis: In research of the type we did, it is important not only to know the age of the respondent, but, concommitant with this, to know the period during which he reached political awareness. Those in the oldest age group became aware of the political world around them during the Bolshevik Revolution and turbulent years which immediately followed. Although their views may have

TABLE VII-2(A)

AGE RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. Favorable-Unfavorable Perceptions

AGES 16-21 (116)



AGES 21-30 (72)



AGES 31-40 (75)



* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

AGES 41 - 50 (91)



AGES 51 - 60 (122)



AGES 61 AND OVER (69)



* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VII-2(B)

B. Strength-Weakness Perceptions

AGES 16-21 (116)



AGES 22-30 (72)



AGES 31-40 (75)



* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

AGES 41 - 50 (91)



AGES 51 - 60 (122)





* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VII-2(C)

C. Change, Regardless of Direction



become modified over the years, the traumatic events of 1917 and the years just after may have been a strong formative influence upon their thinking about Russia. Our conversations with tourists, including many elderly tourists, during our trips to the Soviet Union convince us that many persons (especially among the less-educated) who go to the Soviet Union with quite negative expectations are pleasantly surprised and show a marked positive change. This may be the case with the elderly, who, in all probability, have less formal school than those in the younger age groups.

Turning to the strength-weakness perceptions (Table VII-2(B)), we find that the perceptions on people are very roughly similar, and, with two exceptions, the perceptions of government are in the same general range. Those in the sixteen-to-twenty-one group enter the Soviet Union with an image of greater perceptions of strength of the government than any other group, and also shows the greatest shift in the weakness direction. Those in the twenty-two-to-thirty group show the least change, perhaps because the majority of them are language students and had more realistic expectation of strength factors.

In Table VII-2(C), we see that, with one notable exception, those under forty changed more than those over forty. This was to be expected. The notable exception, of course, is the aforementioned elderly group.

The biggest changes on individual question that the elderly group showed were positive changes on just-unjust, peace-loving-non-peace-loving, kind-cruel, and honest-dishonest on the semantic differential on people. No other age group showed such positive changes on these particular adjective pairs.

In summary, we can say that, with the already-noted exception, the intensity of attitude change followed the expected pattern.

Although we have drawn attention to the differences of attitude change among the various groups in these chapters, it is worth emphasizing again, that overall, the similarities of attitude change are perhaps more striking than the differences.

Chapter VIII

Occupation and Income, Related to Attitude Change

Chapter VIII

Occupation and Income, Related to Attitude Change

"Traveling makes more fools than wise men."
---Russian proverb

"I have never managed to lose my old conviction that travel narrows the mind."
---G.K. Chesterton

"I had read and frequently heard repeated, that of all methods of adorning the mind, and forming the judgment, traveling is the most efficacious."
---Comte de Volney

The elite nature of our sample is never more evident than when we look at the occupation and income composition of our respondents. No less than 73% of the sample makes $10,000 or more, and 24% are in the $25,000-or-over income bracket. Forty-seven per cent are businessmen (21%) or professional people (26%) and another 15% are teachers. Only the thinnest scattering of white collar workers and blue collar workers filled out our questionnaires---not enough to make separate categories. Many skilled workers earn enough to afford a trip to the USSR, but of the 549 respondents, only three fell in this category.

Clearly, our sample is heavily weighted with members of the socio-economic elite.

An analytical difficulty in isolating the occupation and income variables is that they are closely intertwined. High occupational status and high income tend to go together.

Almond found this to be the case in his survey of the research on American foreign policy attitudes. He wrote:

"Professional persons and executives have the same attitudes as the upper-income groups. They are the most informed sector of the American population, the most interested in foreign affairs, the least pessimistic about the prospects for peace, and the most optimistic with regard to the capacity of the United States to develop policies which might prevent war.

"At the other end of the scale, unskilled and semi-skilled labor, domestic servants, and farmers are the least informed group in foreigh policy matters, the least interested in international issues, the most pessimistic about efforts to maintain peace, and the most inclined toward nationalist and isolationist attitudes." (Almond, op. cit., p. 124.)

Occupation

Our data show that, in very general terms, the attitudes of businessmen and professional people bear a closer resemblance to each other than they do to any other group. The same can be said about students (30% of the sample) and teachers. The farmers, which comprise 7% of the sample, deviate the most from the norm.

In overall terms, businessmen rated the Soviet Union lower on the positive-negative affect scale and on the strength-weakness scale than any other occupational group. It might be somewhat instructive to quote Peter Filene, writing about American business attitudes towards the Soviet Union during the early 1920's:

"American business leaders strenously opposed the Soviet regime, for the Communist hostility to private property and profit challenged the foundation of American civilization .... To American businessmen, who tested an idea by application to reality, theoretical dispute was less conclusive than the argument of hard fact. And the fact was that, in dramatic contrast to the apparently limitless prosperity of the United States, Russia presented 'the biggest business failure in history.'

Thus, all the moral objections which business leaders raised against the Soviet regime in the early 1920's were ultimately subsidiary to the practical and, in their opinion, crucial objection that the Communist economic system clearly did not work." (Peter Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933, Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 103-105.)

Actually, in the overall total, businessmen were very slightly more positive about the Soviet Union after travel; yet, they still had the most negative total score. Businessmen responded least warmly to the Russian people, even though, on balance they were favorable. On the individual questions, businessmen perceived the Soviet government as considerably more backward after travel. This was true of all five occupational groups, but it was especially true of professional people and businessmen.

The students---most of whom were Russian-language students---were the more positive about the people before and after travel, the least negative about the government, and showed the greatest negative change towards Soviet society. The likely reasons are the same ones that were discussed for the Russian-language speakers in Chapter VI. The students saw the government as stronger than any other group except the teachers.

One aspect of the teachers' attitude change was unusual: they showed less positive affect for the people after travel than before. The change was a very slight one, to be sure, but it clearly was a departure from the norm.

On the issue of social welfare, teachers and students showed definite negative changes, while the other three groups showed clear positive changes.

TABLE VIII -1(A)

OCCUPATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGES

A. FAVORABLE — UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

STUDENTS (159)



PROFESSIONS (190)



BUSINESSMEN (113)



FARMERS (37)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL

**A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VIII-1(A)

OCCUPATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE – UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

TEACHERS (83)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VIII -1(B)

OCCUPATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

STUDENT (136)



PROFESSIONS (107)



BUSINESSMEN (160)



FARMERS (57)



* B = BEFORE TRAVEL
** A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VIII - 1 (B)

OCCUPATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

TEACHER (83)



*B = BEFORE TRAVEL
**A = AFTER TRAVEL

TABLE VIII-1(C)

OCCUPATION RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION



(1) STUDENT (169)
(2) PROFESSIONS (140)
(3) BUSINESSMEN (113)
(4) FARMERS (37)
(5) TEACHERS (63)

However, all five groups had an over-all positive evaluation of social welfare. The businessman and the professionals showed very slight negative changes on education, but teachers and students showed moderate negative changes.

The greatest change of any group on any question was the heightened perception of athiesm of the Soviet people on the part of the teachers.

Politicians who stand for elective office are often heard to exclaim that farmers are less predictable than any other societal group. Whether this is generally true or not, it certainly was true of our sample of farmers.

The farmers became more favorably disposed to Soviet society and thought the Soviet government was stronger after travel. These changes were very slight, to be sure, but the farmers were the only group to change in those directions.

Most surprising of all was the farmers' attitudes towards agriculture in the USSR. Most experts on the Soviet Union would agree that the Soviet Union has achieved some rather remarkable successes since the Bolshevik Revolution, but they would further agree that those successes have not been in the field of agriculture. Their consensus on this matter is simply underlined by frequent critical articles in the Soviet press on the lagging state of agriculture. Four of the five occupational groups in our sample showed an unfavorable change on Soviet agriculture. The one group with real expertise in this area---the farmers---experienced a definite positive attitude change. Although their overall evaluation was negative, they had entered the Soviet Union the most negative of all the groups about agriculture and came out the least negative.

Unfortunately, there were only thirty-seven farmers in our sample, and so we can not be as sure of the data on that group as on the other larger occupational groups. Further, almost all the farmers traveled in three "people-to-people" groups, and we have no way of knowing what the group experience was. It is highly likely that they were shown some model farms.

The farmers, incidentally, showed the biggest positive change on people. They also were the only one of the groups to perceive the Soviet people as being more religious than had been anticipated before travel. The other groups saw the Russians as being considerably more athiestic after travel.

As Table VII-1(C) shows, farmers experienced somewhat more attitude change, regardless of direction, than the other occupational groups.

Income

The data on attitudes of the various income groups is most interesting. If we look at the "total" column on Favorable-Unfavorable perceptions, we see that there is a gradual progression from positive to negative. That is, each succeeding wealthier income group perceives the Soviet Union a bit more negatively.

The same pattern holds true for strength-weakness perceptions. That is, starting with least wealthy and moving up to the $25,000-or-over group, we observe that each income group perceives the Soviet government and people as being slightly less strong than the previous group.

In sum, the more wealthy one is, the less likely one is to react favorably to the Soviet Union, and the less likely one is going to be impressed by its strength. This is not altogether surprising. One might expect that those who "are accustomed to the better things in life" might be more struck by the contrast between their own affluent surroundings and conditions in the Soviet Union.

Compared to the other groups, the highest income group showed especially large changes in the weakness direction on the progressive-backward and organized-disorganized semantic differentials.

TABLE VIII-2(A)

INCOME RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE — UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

UNDER $5,000 (15)



$5,000 — $9,999 (96)



$10,000 — $14,999 (107)



$15,000 — $24,999 (95)



*B = Before Travel
**A = After Travel

TABLE VIII -2 (A)

INCOME RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

A. FAVORABLE - UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS

Over $25,000 (98)



*B = Before Travel
** A = After Travel

TABLE VIII-2(B)

INCOME RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

B. STRENGTH – WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

UNDER $5,000 (15)



$5,000 – $9,999 (96)



$10,000 – $14,999 (107)



$15,000 – $24,999 (85)



* B = Before Travel

** A = After Travel

TABLE XIII-2 (B)

INCOME RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

B. STRENGTH - WEAKNESS PERCEPTIONS

Over $25,000 (98)



* B = Before Travel
** A = After Travel

TABLE VIII-2 (C)

INCOME RELATED TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

C. AVERAGE CHANGE REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION



(1) Under $5,000 (15)
(2) $5,000 – $9,999 (96)
(3) $10,000 – $14,999 (101)
(4) $15,000 – $24,999 (93)
(5) Over $25,000 (98)